Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 66 | Issue 2

Article 1

1975

Criminal Law: Student Comments

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Criminal Law: Student Comments, 66 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 117 (1975)

This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Tna JO uRAL op

Vol. 66, No. 2

CRMINAL LAW & CImiNoLOY
Copyright (D 1975 by Northwestern University School of Law

Printed in U.S.A.

CRIMINAL LAW
COMMENTS
Student contributors to this issue are Michael K. Yarbrough,
James F. Gossett, Kristine A. Rapp, and Arthur J. Salzberg
AVAILABILITY OF FEDERAL POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IN
LIGHT OF A SUBSEQUENT CHANGE IN LAW
INTRODUCTION

Our system of justice seeks finality in criminal prosecutions in order to ensure the adequate administration of justice. Yet, the protection of rights through appeal and through the
availability of a special reviewing forum to
afford relief in exceptional cases has traditionally been a part of the criminal justice system.
This special relief has taken the form of the
writ of habeas corpus and the more recent
federal counterpart of habeas corpus: section
2255 of title 28 of the United States Code.:
128 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) reads, in part, as
follows:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a
court established by Act of Congress claiming
the right to be released upon the ground that
the sentence was imposed in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or
that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was
in excess of the maximum authorized by law,
or is otherwise subject to collateral attack
may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at
any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records
of the case conclusively show that the prisoner
is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause
notice thereof to be served upon the United
States attorney, grant a prompt hearing
thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or
that the sentence imposed was not authorized
by law or otherwise open to collateral attack,
or that there had been such a denial or mfringement of the constitutional rights of the
prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable
to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and
set the judgment aside and shall discharge the
prisoner or resentence him or grant a new

The tension between these two competing
concerns has been the subject of discussion
as courts seek to determine when further appeals from a conviction will no longer be allowed. It is necessary to impose finality on
prosecutions after having offered the defendant
an adequate opportunity to present his claims
to higher courts for review. Yet, when a defendant alleges a violation of a fundamental
right in the trial process, the courts may be
egregiously denying the defendant justice if
they fail to hear the defendant's claim. 2 judges

make mistakes and, cognizant of these errors,
reviewing courts may grant a petitioner yet
another hearing to see if the "right" decision
has been made. Recognizing that courts can
never make the conclusively correct decision,
however, the criminal justice system must impose limits on the appellate process. 3
Traditionally the avenues of appeal established the necessary finality. After an exhaustrial or correct the sentence as may appear
appropriate.
See note 23 infra for a discussion of the relationship between habeas corpus and § 2255.
2 In his extensive article on the development of
federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, Paul M.
Bator noted:
Assuming that there 'exists,' in an ultimate
sense, a 'correct' decision of a question of law,
we can never be assured that any particular
tribunal has in the past made it; we can always continue to ask whether the right rule
was applied, whether a new rule should not
have been fashioned.
Bator, Finality in Crimindal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,76 HARV. L. REv.
441,3 447 (1963).
Bator concludes that "if a criminal judgment is
ever to be final, the notion of legality must at
some point include the assignment of final competence to determine legality." Id. at 450.
17
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tion of these standard appellate procedures a
defendant could bring only the most grievous
claims of unjust confinement in a writ of habeas corpus, alleging a violation of constitutional rights or lack of jurisdiction in the trial
court. Increasingly, however, the Supreme
Court has expanded the availability of this
post-conviction relief to allow appeals from
otherwise final convictions.
Recently the Supreme Court in United
States v. Davis4 held that confinement in violation of a law of the United States, as well as
an unconstitutional detention, allowed a motion
under section 2255. This decision also held
that a change in law subsequent to a person's
conviction and appeal was also sufficient to
merit collateral attack. The subsequent interpretations of this decision, coupled with its historical justification, provide guidelines for understanding the import of the holding.
A brief review of the facts of Davis
provides a background for the discussion of
the Court's reasoning. Joseph Anthony Davis,
classified 1-A by his draft board, received an
order to report for a pre-induction physical in
February of 1965. Due to illness and failure to
notify his local board of his current address,
Davis missed several scheduled appearances
and was therefore declared delinquent by his
local board. After refusing twice to report for
induction subsequent to this delinquent classification, 5 he was prosecuted and convicted. 6
While Davis' appeal was pending in the
Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court announced

its decision in Gitknecht v. United States.7 In
Gutknecht the Court held that "the selective
service regulations that accelerated the induction of delinquent registrants by shifting them
to the first priority in the order of call were
punitive in nature and, as such, were without
legislative sanction!" ' The Ninth Circuit
therefore remanded the Davis case for consideration "in light of the intervening decision...."

On remand the district court con-

cluded that there had been no acceleration
because of Davis' delinquent status and found
that the decision in Gultknecht, therefore, did
not affect Davis' conviction.
While Davis' request for a writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court was pending, the Ninth
Circuit decided United States v. Fox.10 The
Fox court applied the Gutknecht decision to
reverse the conviction of Fox, reasoning that
"Fox's induction was accelerated by the declaration of delinquency as a matter of law
[because] [w]ithout the declaration, the Board
could not have ordered him to report for
induction."1 "I The circumstances leading to
Fox's induction order were virtually identical
12
to those in Davis' case.
In light of the Fox decision, Davis unsuccessfully sought a rehearing before the court of
appeals and commenced serving his three year
sentence. Davis then instituted a collateral
7

396 U.S. 295 (1970).

8417 U.S. at 338

(Davis paraphrasing Gutkiecht).
9432 F.2d 1009 (9th Cir. 1970).
10 454 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1972).

4 417 U.S. 333 (1974).
5 This delinquent classification was authorized

by 32 C.F.R. § 1642.4(a) (1967) which allowed
a local board to declare a registrant delinquent for
failure to comply with appropriate duties. Such
duties include reporting for a physical exam (32
C.F.R. § 1641.4 (1974)) and keeping the local
board informed of a current address (32 C.F.R. §
1641.1 (1974)).
'6 60 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) provides, in pertinent
part:
Any person . . . who in any manner shall

knowingly fail or neglect or refuse to perform
any duty required of him under or in the execution of this title, or rule, regulations, or
directions made pursuant to this title . . .
shall, upon conviction in any district court of
the United States of competent jurisdiction, be
punished by imprisonment for not more than
five years or a fine of not more than $10,000,
or by both such fine and imprisonment.

The court in Gutknecht had invalidated the
induction of a delinquent on the basis of evidence
of actual punitive acceleration of induction on the
part of the local board. Relying on the Gutknecht
reasoning, the government offered evidence of lack
of actual acceleration of the defendant's induction
in both Fox and Davis. The court in Davis found
no actual acceleration of the defendant's induction
despite Davis' delinquent classification. The government had shown that many registrants in the
same class as Davis had already been inducted
prior to Davis due to Davis' failure to report for
scheduled physicals.
The decision in Fox, however, established a conclusive presumption that a declaration of delinquency by a local board accelerated the induction
of a registrant. The Fox court reasoned that the
local board could not have ordered the registrant's induction were it not for the delinquent
classification, and thus delinquency hastened the
induction.
12 417 U.S. at 339.
31
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proceeding under section 2255, asserting that
the decision in Fox had affected a change in
law in the Ninth Circuit which should afford
him collateral relief. The district court summarily denied petitioner's motion. The court of
appeals affirmed this decision without consider13
ing the merits of Davis' claim. They reasoned that the decision in Davis on direct appeal was the law of the case and that any new
law in that circuit would not be applied "under
circumstances such as here presented." 14 Because the case presented "a seemingly important question concerning the extent to which
relief under section 2255 is available by reason
15
the Suof an intervening change in law,"
preme Court granted certiorari.
LAW VIOLATION COGNIZABLE
In deciding that a change in statutory interpretation would afford a prisoner recourse
under section 2255, the majority in Davis
looked first to the statutory language itself.
They cited the first paragraph of this section
which allows a federal prisoner to assert a
claim that his "confinement is 'in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United
States.' "s The majority felt that this language rather plainly indicated that a violation
of the law is cognizable.
The dissent, however, contended that the
third paragraph of section 2255 operated to
more specifically define the precise scope of relief. Justice Rehnquist pointed out, moreover,
that the passage from the first paragraph
quoted by the majority "does not speak of an
illegal 'confinement' as suggested by the Court,
or even an illegal conviction, but rather of illegal sentences." 17 Therefore Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that only when sentences were in violation of the constitution or laws of the United
States, could the court grant relief under section 2255.
Justice Rehnquist interpreted paragraph one
to be concerned with the availability of motions, whereas paragraph three listed the relief
which the courts could grant. This third paragraph made "no mention of judgments ren1s

472 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1972).

14 Id.

1 417 U.S. at 341.
16 417 U.S. at 342 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255).
17 417 U.S. at 356 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

dered in violation of the laws of the United
States." 18 In analyzing appropriate situations
for relief, Justice Rehnquist found relief available only when: (1) the court which rendered
judgment was without jurisdiction, (2) the
sentence was not authorized by law or was
otherwise open -to collateral attack, or (3)
such a denial of constitutional rights had occurred as to render the judgment vulnerable to
collateral attack. 9 The dissent argued that the
facts of Davis did not meet any of these tests.
The majority retorted to this reading of the
statute by characterizing it as "microscopic,"
while admitting that -the "statutory language is
20
The majorsomewhat lacking in precision."
ity contended that the subsequent judicial interpretations of the statute cleared up any ambiguity and supported their interpretation that
a violation of the law is sufficient for a section
2255 motion. Judge Friendly cogently recognized the technicalities of these arguments in
2
United States v. Sobell l in which he 'spoke
about his attempts to analyze section 2255:
If it be deemed futile to endeavor to draw
much meaning from the rather murky language of § 2255 and we turn for help to the
decisions thereunder, we find these telling us
that, in determining whether relief under
§ 2255 ought be granted, we should look to the
previous practice in habeas corpus with respect to federal prisoners: . .. [b]ut this also
does not get us far; the glass itself is a dark
22

one.

Thus, the language of section 2255, although
susceptible to analysis, is ambiguous. The cases
dealing with this area provide some assistance
in delineating its parameters.
A review of the case law associated with the
availability of habeas corpus and section 2255
relief demonstrates the consistent expansion of
the cognizable grounds for relief. The Judicial
Conference of 1942 recommended the passage
of section 2255 as a more convenient substi1s

417 U.S. at 357 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

19 417 U.S. at 357 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

For a discussion of the even more limited viewpoint of Justice Black toward § 2255 relief see
note 89 infra.
20 417 U.S. at 343.
21314 F.2d 314 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
847 (1963).
22

314 F.2d at 322.
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23

tute for habeas corpus for federal prisoners.
Since the scope of section 2255 was to be exactly the same as that of habeas corpus relief,
a review of the development of habeas corpus
will also provide accurate background for section 2255.
The language in the Judiciary Act of 1789
which provided for habeas corpus relief stated
only that the courts of the United States "shall
have power

to issue writs of . . . habeas

corpus." 24 The Supreme Court initially limited
habeas corpus relief to cases where the trial
court had never had jurisdiction to consider
25
the case. The decision in Ex parte Watkins
established the principle that as long as the
trial court had proper jurisdiction, even a substantive error by that court would not render a
detention illegal so as to allow a writ of habeas corpus to issue.
This limitation pervaded the habeas corpus
decisions after Ex parte Watkins, but courts
began to contrive jurisdictional defects in
many cases in order to grant relief. For example, in Johnson v. Zerbst,26 the Court held that
23
See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205
(1952) for a detailed history of the development
of § 2255. Briefly, the Judicial Conference of the
United States was convened to recommend revisions in the United States Code. Justice Vinson,
the chairman of the Judicial Conference, was also
the author of the Hayman decision. This conference recommended passage of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in
order to alleviate problems that had developed in
the administration of habeas corpus proceedings
for federal prisoners. The grounds for § 2255 relief were intended to be exactly the same as those
for federal habeas corpus for state prisoners. The
only effect of § 2255 was to change the forum that
federal prisoners would use to present their claims.
4 Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1
Stat. 81.
25 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
26 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Two major cases following Ex parte Watkins characterized the inconsistencies that developed as courts grappled with
the proper scope of habeas corpus relief. Frank v.
Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915), dealt with a state
prisoner's attempt to raise an alleged constitutional
error in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. The
Court in Frank concluded that if the state court
considered the constitutional claim on appeal, the
federal habeas corpus court may review only the
state procedure of review. However, in Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923), the Court held that
federal courts could redetermine federal claims de
novo on petitions for habeas corpus relief. Although commentators have sought to reconcile
these two holdings, these decisions represent the
vacillation that developed in federal habeas corpus
proceedings.
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a federal trial court did not have jurisdiction
over a defendant who was denied assistance of
counsel. Decisions such as this demonstrate the
attenuated arguments to which courts resorted
in order to find that an error resulted in lack
of jurisdiction in the trial court. The courts
refused to admit that the real thrust of their
decisions was to expand the issues properly
recognized in a habeas corpus proceeding.
Rather, they continued to obscure the situation
by references to lack of jurisdiction.27 This ar28
tificiality led the Court in Waley v. Johnston
to acknowledge expressly that constitutional as
well as jurisdictional questions were available
as bases for habeas corpus relief.
Brown v. Allen"9 then expanded this Waley
doctrine by holding that all federal constitutional questions were cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings. When the Supreme
Court decided Brown in 1953, Congress had
revised the United States Code to substitute
section 2255 as the avenue of relief for federal
prisoners in lieu of federal habeas corpus. The
Brown decision concerned only federal habeas
corpus; yet, since Congress intended section
2255 to be the precise equivalent of federal habeas corpus any expansion of rights for state
prisoners would apply equally to federal prisoners under section 2255.
To complete the availability of constitutional
issues for use in collateral attack, Kaufman v.
27 One commentary has described this decision
as follows:
[This decision] reveals in a dramatic way
that the use of 'jurisdiction' merely served to
obscure the real problem, which was the
proper range of issues cognizable on habeas.
Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 103&, 1054 (1970).
28 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
29 344
U.S. 443 (1953). The Brown Court
claimed to be following Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86 (1923), in holding that all federal constitutional questions raised by a state petitioner were
cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding
despite a full state hearing. The argument against
allowing such broad habeas corpus relief was the
desire for finality in criminal prosecutions, but the
Court in Brown reasoned that habeas corpus did
not concern guilt or innocence as much as protection of constitutional rights. Implicit in Brown
was the desire to have constitutional claims considered in a federal forum. Another primary motivation was to ensure the uniform application of
federal constitutional law by having federal courts
decide constitutional claims.
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United States"° made constitutional issues
available for use in collateral attack by permitting federal prisoners to raise any constitutional claim on a section 2255 motion. The
only limitation here was that having made a
constitutional claim upon direct appeal a federal prisoner could not again raise the same
claim in a subsequent section 2255 motion.
There is little indication that courts prior to
Davis had envisioned an expansion of cognizable issues for collateral attack to claims which
do not present a constitutional question. Unless
the facts of the claim went to jurisdictional errors,3 1 courts would deny such motions in habeas corpus. Yet, courts before the Davis decision had agreed to hear claims of violation of
law that went to the illegality of the detention
itself. For example, -the failure of public authorities to provide mental treatment for a patient involuntarily committed was sufficient to
32
merit collateral attack in Rouse v. Cameron.
However, cases such as Lothridge v. United
States33 continued to require generally a claim
of constitutional dimensions for a section 2255
motion. In that case the defendant brought a
section 2255 action claiming that the judge
improperly failed to instruct the jury on entrapment. The court curtly dismissed this motion on the grounds that "no issue of constituso 394 U.S. 217 (1969). Before the Kaufman decision some federal courts had refused to hear certain questions under § 2255 which courts had allowed state prisoners to raise on habeas corpus.
Compare Warren v. United States, 311 F.2d 673
(8th Cir. 1963) (illegality of search and seizure
not cognizable under § 2255) zvith Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (illegality of search
and seizure allowed to be raised on habeas corpus
by state prisoners). The Kaufinaun decision put
such conflict to rest by holding that all constitutional claims are cognizable under § 2255 for federai prisoners. The basis of this decision was a desire to provide a separate proceeding to consider
constitutional claims whether for a federal or state
prisoner.
31 See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193
(1830).
32 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Petitioner in
this case was involuntarily committed to a mental
hospital and brought a writ of habeas corpus for
release. The petitioner claimed that in order to
commit a person against his will a court must
have some justification; although treatment had
been the purpose of this commitment, no treatment
had been given. See also Donaldson v. O'Connor,
493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974).
33 441 F.2d 919 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1003 (1971).

tional dimensions being present, the issue of
entrapment cannot be raised on collateral attack under section 2255." 34
Even Kaufman v. United States, the controlling Supreme Court case in this area prior to
Davis, had mentioned in dicta that courts had
refused to allow claims of error of law by a
trial court to be raised in collateral attack, 35
citing Sunal v. Large36 and Hill v. United
States. 37 The Supreme Court had never held
that collateral proceedings were absolutely
closed to statutory questions, however, and the
Davis majority found that Sunal and Hill
offered little support for Kaufman's contention
that courts will not hear claims of error of law
in a section 2255 motion.
The Kaufman Court cited the decision in
Sun a as standing for the proposition that section 2255 is not designed for collateral review
of errors of law committed by a trial court.
The Court in Davis, however, felt that Sunal
merely stated the proposition as a general rule
subject to exceptions. The Davis Court contended that Sunal could not obtain relief under
section 2255 because of his failure to avail
himself of the regular appellate procedure. The
Davis Court cited the following passage from
Sunal in support of this interpretation of the
case:
Of course if Sunal and Kulick had pursued
the appellate course and failed, their cases
would be quite different. But since they chose
not to pursue the remedy which they had, we
do not think they should now be allowed to
justify their failure by saying they deemed
any appeal futile. 38
341d. at 922. See also Limon-Gonzales v. United
States, 499 F.2d 136 (5th Cir. 1974) where a
federal prisoner sought § 2255 relief claiming a violation of rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court denied this petition since
the grounds asserted did not "rise to the constitutional or jurisdictional significance as required for
relief under section 2255." 499 F.2d at 937.
35 394 U.S. at 223.
36 332 U.S. 174 (1947).
37 368 U.S. 424 (1962).
38 332 U.S. at 181. The Court focused on the
failure of these defendants to utilize appellate procedures as a basis for a denial of their post-conviction motion. The court relates this failure to
appeal to finality in criminal cases:
If defendants who accept the judgment of conviction and do not appeal can later renew their
attack on the judgment by habeas corpus, liti-
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Thus the impression remains that had Sunal
appealed, the Court might have deemed his
claim appropriate for section 2255 relief.
The Court in Hill also denied a section
2255 motion. The Kaufman Court contended
that this denial substantiated the position that
a defendant could not raise a statutory claim
in such a motion. But the language used by the
Court in Hill to deny the petitioner's claim actually recognized a right, as the Court in
Davis read the passage, to review some statutory claims. The trial court in Hill did not
allow the defendant to speak in his own behalf
before sentencing. The Supreme Court then
denied Hill's section 2255 motion based upon
that error by saying:
It is an error which is neither jurisdictional
nor constitutional. It is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair
procedure. It does not present 'exceptional circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent.' Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27P
One might question whether the second and
third sentences in this passage merely further
explain the nature of jurisdictional or constitutional errors rather than establish additional
grounds for relief. The Court in Davis, however, had no doubt. The language of section
2255 coupled with the consistent expansion of
habeas corpus relief by the courts led the
Court in Davis to recognize fully a right to
present some errors of law for review under
section 2255 subject only to the general caveats of Hill.
One case following the Davis decision pergation in these criminal cases will be interminable. Wise judicial administration of the
federal courts counsels against such course,
at least where the error does not trench on
any constitutional rights of defendants nor involve the jurisdiction of the trial court.
332 U.S. at 182.
Judge Rutledge, in his dissent in Sunal, found
this denial of relief to be truly unjust:
Certainly a basic miscarriage of justice is no
less great or harmful, either to the individual
or to the general cause of personal liberty,
merely because appeal has not been taken,
than where appeal is taken but relief is
wrongfully denied.
332 U.S. at 190.
39

368 U.S. at 428.
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mitted a section 2255 motion for an alleged violation of a law of the United States. In
United States ex rel. Soto v. United States,40
petitioner claimed that the trial court, by failing to advise appellant of his right to proceed
pro se, deprived him of that right thereby committing reversible error. In granting this motion the Third Circuit characterized this right
to proceed pro se as a fundamental right even
if not of constitutional dimensions. They therefore concluded that the statutory right was sufficient to afford jurisdiction under the holding
of Davis.
Although the court in Soto held that the
right violated was fundamental, the court did
not provide any guidelines for determining the
fundamental nature of rights in the future.
This court, then, held only that a violation of
this right to proceed pro se satisfied the test of
Hilt that exceptional circumstances be shown
before courts may grant collateral relief.
The preceding section thus illustrates the
continual expansion of grounds cognizable as
basis for relief under habeas corpus and the
related provision of section 2255. The following section evaluates the second element of the
Court's decision in Davis, the effect of a subsequent change in law.
HIsToRY OF CHANGE IN LAW
After establishing that confinement in violation of a law of the United States affords a
petitioner recourse under section 2255, the
issue remains whether a change in law after
conviction creates an illegal confinement which
merits relief. Is a person truly being confined
in violation of the laws of the United States
when he has been convicted under a valid statute, when he has utilized the appropriate appellate process fully, and when he has been finally
sentenced, only to have a subsequent change in
the law present him with an opportunity for
release? This section will analyze the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Davis Which al4o 504 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1974). The court in
Soto recognized the expansion of § 2255 relief
which Davisnow affords. The Soto court noted that
the "Government's position [that law violations
could not be raised under § 2255] was widely ac-

cepted before Davis

...

Many commentators have

read Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947), and
Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962), as
limiting § 2255 relief solely to constitutional
claims." 504 F.2d at 1342.
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lowed a change in law to suffice for a motion
under section 2255, and then it will review the
judicial history concerned with the change in
law issue.
To support their contention that the change
in law presented by Davis affords a prisoner
relief under section 2255, the majority in
Davis relied primarily upon two cases, neither
of which truly support its position. The
Court cited passages from Sanders v. United
States"' and Kaufman v. United States42 to indicate that a subsequent change in law after
conviction and sentencing undoubtedly affords
one access to section 2255.
In Sanders the petitioner was serving a sentence for bank robbery. The court denied a
hearing on Sanders' first motion to vacate the
sentence, which he filed on January 4, 1960,
since he alleged no facts, but only a conclusion
that he was entitled to relief. On September 8,
1960, Sanders filed a second section 2255 motion which alleged facts to demonstrate his
mental incompetence at the time of trial and
sentencing. The district court also denied this
motion. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision. In denying this request
for a subsequent hearing, the court of appeals
said that the fact that the petitioner knowingly
omitted relevant facts at the time of his first
43
motion barred his subsequent motion. The
Supreme Court, however, held that the traditional notions of finality of criminal convictions were not applicable to section 2255 motions since fundamental rights were concerned.
It cited Fay v. Noia for the principle that res
44
judicata is inapplicable in habeas proceedings.
41373
42 394

43 297
44372

U.S. 1 (1962).

U.S. 217 (1969).

F.2d 735, 736 (9th Cir. 1961).
U.S. 391 (1963). Res judicata traditionally prohibits a party from relitigating with the
same opposing party an issue that a prior court
has already determined. Courts use this phrase frequently when considering collateral attacks to indicate that grounds raised on appeal may still be
raised in a habeas corpus proceeding in federal
court. Kaufman allowed all constitutional claims
to be raised on a § 2255 motion but also held that
if petitioner raised the constitutional claim on direct appeal, he could not then relitigate this issue.
The Kaufman Court reasoned that a determination
of a constitutional issue by a federal appellate
court satisfied the requirement for federal review
of constitutional claims.
Thus a federal prisoner may make subsequent
motions to vacate judgment under § 2255. In this
sense the principle of res judicata is inapplicable.

In establishing standards to determine if a hearing on a section 2255 motion is necessary, the
Court in Sanders reasoned that a prior section
2255 motion would bar a subsequent motion if:
(1) the court had considered the same ground
in a prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits, or (3) the ends of
justice would not be served by reaching the
merits of the subsequent application.
The facts of Sanders fall within the first two
of these standards. The court did not reach the
merits of Sanders' first section 2255 motion
but denied it because of the mere conclusory
nature of the motion and the absence of any
factual support for the allegations. Thus, the
Supreme Court ruled that the court should
properly have allowed Sanders to amend his
application to supply the necessary facts. The
denial of the application did not, therefore, bar
a new motion alleging proper facts. Thus the
Court allowed a subsequent hearing based upon
the first two standards which it listed. The
third standard, therefore, was not applicable to
the Court's holding in Sanders.
In the Sanders Court's discussion of this third
standard, however, the Davis Court found support for its contention that a change in law
merits a section 2255 motion. The Davis majority quoted the following passage from Sanders: "The applicant may be entitled to a new
hearing upon showing an intervening change
in law . . . ." - However, the Sanders Court
was concerned with a hearing on a claim concededly cognizable under section 2255, not
with grounds for a section 2255 motion. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Davis, discussed this distinction:
Thus the Court in Sanders was faced with the
question not of whether a particular type of
claim is cognizable at all in a § 2255 proceeding but simply whether a hearing is required
in a claim concededly within the reach of that
section. 46
But a petitioner may not relitigate the same issues
once a federal appellate forum has decided them
unless the law has significantly changed since the
prior appeal.
45 373 U.S. at 17.
46417 U.S. at 362 n.18 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thei availability of a hearing where the
claimant presents an otherwise valid § 2255 motion
is a distinct problem. Courts may not exchange
criteria for the sufficiency of a motion itself with
the determination of whether to hold a hearing.

COMMENTS
Thus the decision in Sanders presumed a sufficient claim and therefore considered the
secondary question of the availability of a
hearing on the merits.
The complete quote from Sanders, moreover,

Under the 1867 Act (now 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq.
(Supp. IV, 1974)) United States District Courts
have jurisdiction to determine whether a prisoner
has been deprived of liberty in violation of constitutional rights, even though the proceedings resulting in incarceration may be unassailable on the
face of the record. Under the Act, courts have
held a variety of allegations to permit challenge of
convictions on facts not contained within the record. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 109 (1942)
(coerced guilty plea) ; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938) (no intelligent waiver of counsel in
federal court) ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935) (knowing use of perjured testimony by
prosecution); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923) (mob domination of trial).
The concern when deciding whether a hearing is
necessary is with the nature and specificity of the
facts presented in the prisoner's petition. The crucial element is whether the disputed facts alleged
in the motion under § 2255 can be resolved by recourse to the trial record. Thus, the principle remains that even if a § 2255 motion presents sufficient factual allegations, the district court need not
always have a hearing. Eaton v. United States,
458 F.2d 704 (7th Cir.). cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880
(1972).
When a petitioner alleges facts not found in the
record, a hearing becomes necessary. In Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962) petitioner alleged that his guilty plea at trial was involuntary. The Court recognized that "a guilty
plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is
void. A conviction based upon such a plea is open
to collateral attack." 368 U.S. at 493.
The district court denied Machibroda's motion
without a hearing. The Supreme Court, however,
held that this type of claim alleged a disputed
issue which neither the record nor the personal
knowledge of the judge could settle. Thus the
Court held that the "District Court did not proceed in conformity with § 2255 when it made findings on controverted issues of fact, without notice
to the petitioner and without a hearing." 368 U.S.
at 494.
The petitioner had alleged facts which, if true,
would have afforded him relief under § 2255. The
district court could not determine the accuracy of
the claim by recourse merely to the record or to
the judge's personal knowledge. This type of a situation necessitates a hearing.
The Court in Machibroda noted that the presence of the petitioner himself at this hearing is not
always necessary. It is within the district court's
discretion to call the prisoner for the hearing and
"there are times when allegations of facts outside
the record can be fully investigated without requiring the personal presence of the prisoner." 368
U.S. at 495.

[Vol. 66

indicates a further dilution of this passage's
significance for the Davis majority:
If purely legal questions are involved, the applicant may be entitled to a new hearing upon
showing an intervening change in the law or
some other justification for having failed to
raise a crucial point or argument in the prior
47
application.
Therefore, a mere change in law was not the
issue in Sanders, but rather a change or justification sufficient to explain the petitioner's
failure to raise a crucial point or argument in
his prior application. The facts of Davis do
not present this situation since Davis fully
argued .all issues in his direct appeal which he
later sought to present in his section 2255 motion. The considerations in Sanders, then,
offer scant support for the contention of the
Court in Davis that any change in law makes
collateral attack possible.
The Davis Court next referred to Kaufman
v. United States for support. In Kaufman the
majority adopted the reasoning of Judge
Wright in his dissent in Thornton v. United
States"s from which the Davis Court carefully
selected an excerpt. Justice Stewart in Davis,
citing Thornton, argued that a section 2255
motion would be permissible "if new law has
been made . . . since the trial and appeal."" 9
Again, viewing this quotation in context provides a more accurate picture:
Where a federal trial or appellate court has
had a 'say' on a federal prisoner's claim, there
may be no need for collateral relitigation. But
what if the federal trial or appellate court said
nothing because the issue was not raised? ....
What if new law has been made or facts uncovered relating to the constitutional clain
since the trial and appeal? 50
Here the quote relates to facts different from
373 U.S. at 17.
F.2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1966). In Thornton
the petitioner alleged that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment had been used to
convict him at trial. The majority denied his §2255
motion since they found that he could have raised
these issues at trial and on appeal but had failed to
do so. Judge Wright, dissenting, argued that since
the court of appeals had never heard the constitutional claim, the court should allow the claim on a
§ 2255 motion despite the failure to raise it on
appeal.
49 417 U.S. at 342.
50 Id. (emphasis added).
47

48 368
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those of the case at bar. Kaufman had failed to
raise a constitutional claim on appeal with the
result that the court of appeals did not consider that issue. However, since the claim was
of constitutional dimensions, the court could
consider this motion for relief under section
2255.
These cases represent the extent of Supreme
Court discussion on the change of law issue.51
The reliance of the Davis Court on these prior
cases, therefore, seems inappropriate since
these prior cases do not concern the issue presented by the facts of Davis. The lower federal
courts also have considered this problem; yet,
they too have reached no consensus concerning
the availability of habeas corpus or section
2255 relief after a change in law. In the past,
courts have consistently rejected the idea that
a convicted criminal who had tried and failed
on appeal could gain a new trial or complete
release due to a subsequent change in law. As
the grounds available for habeas corpus relief
expanded, however, the courts began to waiver
in their firm refusal to consider a convict's
claim due to an intervening change in law.
An early landmark case, Warring v. Colpoys,52
demonstrated the courts' reluctance to
consider an appeal based upon an alleged
change in law. Here the petitioner was sentenced February 24, 1939, on four criminal
contempt charges. On April 14, 1939, the Supreme Court handed down a new interpretation of the statute under which he had been
convicted. This new interpretation would have
resulted in a verdict for petitioner had it applied in his case. In rejecting the habeas corpus petition of the convicted person, the court
said:
When a case is decided it is expected that
people will make their behavior conform to
the rule it lays down and also to the principle
expressed in so far as it can be determined....
51 Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947) is one
other Supreme Court case dealing with a change
in law. Petitioner was convicted for failure to submit to induction; he took no appeal from this conviction since Sunal thought that it would be futile
given the current state of the law. His § 2255
motion came after a favorable change in the law,
but the Supreme Court would not allow a § 2255
motion since Sunal had purposefully by-passed the
appellate review. See note 38 supra.
2122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 678 (1941).

If, at last, the first decision is overruled, then
there is new law, better evidence, or an enlightened basis for prediction. Those transactions which occurred between the two decisions, are, for the most part, accepted history.
This is true even though a person had presented, in proper fashion, his case to the courts.
His rights being finally determined, an attempt
to reopen the question, in view of the new
enlightenment would be greeted with the powerful answer of res judicata.53
The court rejected the idea that a new statutory
construction, as here, invalidated a previous
construction of the statute. It reasoned that
people conform their behavior to existing law.
One who has violated the law of his time
should not, therefore, receive the benefit of a
newer interpretation of the same law.
LaClair v. United States,54 a fairly recent
case, embodies this same rationale. LaClair
was convicted of bank robbery and sentenced
to thirty years. After his conviction, the federal
court reinterpreted the statute under which he
had been convicted to require only an "objective fear" test for the victims of an armed robbery-that is, the gun must have actually been
loaded. LaClair sought to raise this issue on a
section 2255 motion, but the court held that
"it had been repeatedly held that subsequent
changes in substantive decisional law does not
warrant relief under Section 2255." 55
Both of these cases involved statutory
changes which, if applied to the defendants,
would have freed them. But since the petitioner
could not raise errors of law on collateral attack and since the courts had not given these
interpretations retroactive effect, neither petitioner could raise a successful habeas corpus
motion.
When the Supreme Court began to expand
constitutional rights under the fourth amendment, the problems of denying section 2255 relief to those affected by the extension of these
rights increased. In Gaitan v. United States56
defendant was convicted of a narcotics violation with evidence obtained from an illegal
search having been introduced at the trial. Following the establishment of the exclusionary
F.2d at 644.
.4 241 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
55 Id. at 829.
56 295 F.2d 277 (10th Cir. 1961).
53122
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rule in Mapp v. Ohio,57 Gaitan brought a section 2255 motion to vacate the judgment. The
district court rejected this motion for the following reason:
The question whether the marijuana was admissible in evidence or should be excluded was
put squarely in issue in the criminal case. The
question was determined with pinpoint precision. The evidence was admitted and the judg[aInd a
ments and sentences became final ....
change thereafter in the rule relating to the
admissibility of evidence obtained in that manner did not arrest or suspend application of
the principle of res judicata to such judgments
and sentences. 58
The Supreme Court had refused to give Mapp
retroactive effect due to the enormous impact
such retroactivity would have had; thus, Mapp
59
Aldid not truly apply to Gaitan's case.
though the court in Gaitan spoke in terms of
res judicata, retroactive application of the
Mapp decision would have necessarily altered
the court's approach.
60
In United States v. SobeL the defendant
was convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage. His ground of appeal under section 2255
was based upon the Supreme Court's decision
in Grunewald v. United States-' which held
that a prosecutor could not comment on a witness' prior invocation before a grand jury of
the privilege against self-incrimination. Sobell
contended that such comments at his trial had
seriously affected the fairness of the trial. The
Second Circuit dismissed the motion, however,
and reaffirmed the refusal of the courts to
The exclusionary rule
57 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
requires that courts exclude from trial evidence
seized in violation of the fourth amendment.
58 295 F.2d at 280.
59 The Mapp decision did not apply retroactively
and thus the exclusionary rule did not affect the
decision in Gaitan. Thus a motion by Gaitan under
§ 2255 could not have been successful. In cases following Mapp, however, some courts refused to
allow a fourth amendment violation to support a
motion under § 2255. These courts reasoned that
since fourth amendment violations only concerned
police procedure, such violations did not affect the
integrity of the fact finding process at trial.
Therefore the violations were not of such a grievous nature as to support a motion under § 2255.
See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 237
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
60314 F2d 314 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
857 (1963).
61353 U.S. 391 (1957).
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apply subsequent law to convictions already
final:
There is an inevitable attraction in the position that a person convicted of a serious crime
should receive a new trial whenever a later
decision of the highest court indicates that,
with the benefit of hindsight, a different
course should have been followed at his trial
in any consequential respect. Yet for a court
to yield broadly to that attraction not only
would cause 'litigation in these criminal cases
[to) be interminable' 332 U.S. at 182..., but,
in the sole interest of those already convicted
of crime, would drastically impair the ability of
the Government to discharge the duty of pro2
tection which it owes to all its citizens.Q
Even had the court accepted Sobell's claim, the
alleged defect went to the procedure at trial
and neither to the statute under which he was
convicted nor to an element of proof necessary
for conviction. The appropriate relief for Sobell, if the court had allowed his claim, would
have been a new trial. Courts do not favor
granting such relief after an extended lapse of
time. The unavailability of witnesses and the
staleness of the evidence would make such a
trial inconvenient and often unfair.
6
More recently, in Hardy v. United States, 3
the dissent of Judge Bazelon foreshadowed the
Davis ruling. Hardy was convicted of violation
of the narcotics laws. He appealed on the basis
of the delay between the commission of the offense and the arrest, claiming that it was unreasonably long. The court denied this contention on appeal, and Hardy was unable to
obtain a rehearing before the court of appeals.
The Supreme Court also denied his petition
for a writ of certiorari. After Hardy had exhausted all appeals, the decision in Ross v.
United States"4 held a similar delay violative
62 314 F2d at 324. Even though the changes of
law in both Gaitan and Sobell were of constitutional dimensions, the courts did not consider
themselves obligated to consider these claims under
§ 2255. The courts, then, did not need to discuss
the retroactivity of these subsequent changes in
law since the grounds were not sufficient at that
time, even if they were to apply to the petitioner's
case. Courts had fairly broad discretion in considering motions under § 2255 until Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969) held that
every constitutional claim was sufficient for a motion under § 2255. See note 30 supra.
63 381 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
14 349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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of due process. The court of appeals, in affirming the district court's denial of Hardy's section 2255 motion on the basis of the Ross
opinion, stated that "issues disposed of on appeal from the original judgment of conviction
will not be reviewed again under section
2255."65 Judge Bazelon dissented because he
believed that the petitioner had shown that the
claim was subject to collateral attack due to
the constitutional nature of the Ross decision,
that Ross applied retroactively, and that the
previous denial of the same contention by the
court of appeals was no bar to collateral attack
since res judicata did not apply. Judge Bazelon
concluded: "Since Ross intervened between
these appellants' original appeal and their motion under section 2255, and since Ross significantly changed the law in this area, it would
seem quite clear that Sanders entitles these appellants to a new hearing on their claim." 66
A comparison of the majority position with
that of the dissent in Hardy indicates the differing views on the significance of a prior determination. The fact that Hardy consistently
raised the precise issue of unreasonable delay
sufficed to permit the majority to decide that
there had been no manifest injustice. They felt
that Hardy had had an adequate opportunity to
have his claim heard. Judge Bazelon, however,
saw the Ross decision as offering a new precedent which would support a section 2255
motion where a change in law of constitutional
dimensions had occurred.
Several cases which consider the availability
of the privilege against self-incrimination in
cases where the party is seeking to avoid payment of taxes on illegal activities demonstrate
the inconsistencies that ultimately developed.
e6 7
In United States v. Rodgers
defendant was
convicted of not paying the occupational tax
on wagering. A subsequent decision, Marchetti
v. United States,68 allowed the assertion of this
65 Different panels of judges within the same
circuit decided Ross and Hardy. Thus the Ross
decision would not control the decision of the
Hardy court. In addition the court in Ross specifically distinguished its facts from those in Hardy.
The distinction further supports the position that
the Ross decision did not create a change in law
sufficient to merit relief under § 2255 in Hardy's
case.
66 381 F.2d at 953.
67 288 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Okla. 1968).
68 390 U.S. 39 (1968). The Court in Marchetti
recognized that the imnoition nf 'uch a tax was a

privilege effectively to preclude criminal punishment for failure to pay the tax. The court
in Rodgers ruled that "decisional changes in
the law, even involving an interpretation of
the Constitution, do not justify relief by habeas
corpus or Section 2255." 69
In Eby v. United States70 defendant similarly had been convicted for not paying transfer taxes on marijuana transactions. The law
at that time stated that the defendant could not
assert the fifth amendment defense in such a
situation. The Eby court, too, held that the
subsequent change in law effected by Marchetti
did not afford relief to one previously
71
convicted.
However, the Eighth Circuit in 1971 allowed
an identical section 2255 appeal in Scogin v.
United States.7 2 In 1967 Scogin had pleaded
guilty to acquiring marijuana without payment
of the transfer tax. He took no appeal but
rather filed a section 2255 motion following
the decision that the fifth amendment was a
complete defense to any prosecution for failure
to pay this tax. Since this motion to vacate
judgment was the first opportunity after the
change in law that the defendant had to plead
the fifth amendment privilege, the court held it
to be a timely assertion of the privilege. The
court concluded:
[We] are convinced that to allow one to continue to be penalized for conduct which is now
constitutionally immune from punishment
would contravene
basic concepts of justice and
3
fairness.7
proper exercise of the taxing power of Congress.
The privilege against self-incrimination still attached to such a tax, however, and enabled one to
avoid prosecution for failure to pay the tax.
69 288 F. Supp. at 58. The Rodgers court contended that the guilt of the prisoner was not in
issue since the tax itself was valid. Since the petitioner failed to utilize his fifth amendment privilege, the court held that he should not be allowed
to subsequently invoke it after his admission of
guilt at trial.
70286 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Okla. 1968).
71 The court reasoned that the judgment was already final and even if the decision in Marchetti
did apply to petitioner's case, Eby's failure to appeal precluded raising the issue on a § 2255 motion.
772
3 446 F2d 416 (8th Cir. 1971).
In contrast to Rodgers and Eby, moreover,
the decision in Scogin came in 1971 after the
Kaufman decision had required courts to hear
every constitutional claim under § 2255. The constitutional basis of the Marchetti opinion, then,
made consideration of petitioner's claim more compelling due to Kaufman.

COMMENTS
The court focused on the fact that the conduct
for which the defendant was presently incarcerated was now completely immune from punishment due to a constitutionally recognized
defense.
The de-criminalization of the action for
which the defendant had been convicted forms
a basis for distinction between two other cases
which involve a retroactive application of a
statutory construction. In Brough v. United
States74 the defendant was convicted for failure to register for the draft. This offense had
a five year statute of limitations and Brough
was convicted five years and five months after
his eighteenth birthday. The selective service
had employed a "continuing offense" theory to
secure this conviction-that is, that defendant
violated the law each day he failed to register,
with the five year statute of limitation running
from each violation. After the conclusion of
defendant's trial and appeal on this offense, the
Supreme Court in Toussie v. United States75
rejected this selective service continuing offense
theory and held that one must be indicted
within five years and five days of one's eighteenth birthday in order to be prosecuted within
the statute of limitations. The Seventh Circuit
gave retroactive effect to Toussie and allowed
Brought to present a section 2255 motion.
In Santana v. United States,70 however, the
defendant pleaded guilty to receipt of illegally
imported cocaine. The legal presumptions in
effect at that time, that importation of cocaine
and knowledge of that importation could be inferred from possession, induced the defendant
to plead guilty. Subsequently, the decision in
Turner v. United States77 invalidated these
presumptions. Despite retroactive application
of Turner, however, the court in Santana
denied defendant's section 2255 motion. The
court found nothing to show that the guilty
pleas were invalid or unreliable. It held that
a court should not grant a new trial after a
fifteen year delay, and it feared a flood of section 2255 applications. 78
Many courts remained reluctant to recognize
74454 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1971).
,5 397 U.S. 112 (1970).
76477 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
874 (1973).
77 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
78 The reasoning of the

court in Santana must
be limited to the facts of that case, specifically the

[Vol. 66

a change in law as grounds for a motion under
section 2255. The decision in Odom v. United
States79 established the principle which the
Ninth Circuit applied in denying Davis' section 2255 motion. In his case on appeal, petitioner in Odom sought application of a new
test for insanity, developed after his conviction. Odom had pleaded insanity at his trial,
and therefore the court said:
The law in this circuit is clear that when a
matter had been decided adversely on appeal
from a conviction, it cannot be litigated again
on a § 2255 motion.80
Thus, the Ninth Circuit considered only
whether the court had reviewed the issue on
appeal. Since the courts had fully considered
the issue of insanity at trial and on appeal, the
Ninth Circuit decided to bar a section 2255
motion despite the new law that had developed
subsequent to the court's decision.81
Thus the cases prior to Davis displayed a
certain inconsistency and vacillation with regard to whether a subsequent change in law
would allow a motion under section 2255
Much of this confusion among the lower federal courts arose from the expansion of collateral grounds for relief through the more expansive construction of constitutional rights
relating to various aspects of the trial. While

voluntary guilty plea and the extensive lapse of
time between conviction and the appeal. Two years
earlier the same circuit in United States v. Liguori,
438 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1971), considered the effect
of Turner for the purposes of § 2255. Liguori
pleaded not guilty and was convicted at trial; he
did not challenge the validity of the presumptions
in effect at that time on his appeal. The Second
Circuit, however, did not feel this failure to appeal
barred him from raising the validity of these presumptions in issue on a § 2255 motion. The court
stated that the fact that the government had offered
no proof for several key elements of the offense
(since Turner had invalidated essential presumptions) made continued confinement of Liguori unjust.
79 455 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1972).
so 455 F.2d at 160.

81 The Odorn court spoke of issues raised on
appeal without regard to the law as it applied to
those issues at the time of appeal. The Court in
Da-is rejected this issue-oriented approach and
held that when significantly new law appears,
courts must consider the effect of the new law
upon a petitioner's claim under § 2255. It was of
no significance to the ,Davis Court that a petitioner had raised the same issue on appeal since
the Court contended that a change in law gave the
petitioner a totally new claim.
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trends are difficult to determine in this area,
cotqrts have been more willing recently to consider a significant change in law sufficient for
a motion under section 2255.82
CONTEMPORARY VIEW OF CHANGE OF LAW

Questions as to the scope and impact of the
Davis decision still remain in light of the complex nature of the problem dealt with in that
decision. To adequately determine the extent of
the Davis decision insofar as it allows a motion under section 2255 when there has been a
change in law, courts must consider the type
of change, the way in which the change affected the disposition of the defendant's case,
and the procedures which the petitioner followed after conviction. An analysis of the
Davis decision reveals that the Supreme Court
left open the issue of how authoritative the
change in law must be. Therefore, courts may
require some threshold of authoritativeness before the subsequent change in law will suffice
for the purposes of section 2255. Cases following Davis also discuss the issue of retroactivity
and exhaustion of remedies as possible limitations on the impact of the Davis opinion. The
Court in Davis established no adequate standards to be used by future courts to determine
when a change in law should apply to petitioner's case under a section 2255 motion. These
standards should deal with the issue of the authoritativeness of the subsequent decision and
the significance of the decision as applied to the
merits of petitioner's case.
With reference to this first standard Justice
Rhenquist in his dissent in Davis points out
the difficulty in holding that a court should
consider the Fox decision as a change in law
with respect to the Davis case:
Thus the real focus of petitioner's argument
must be that Fox is the governing law. But
in that regard, I cannot see why a decision by
a single panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit should be considered a 'law' of
the United States. In fact the Court of Appeals
itself stated that its decision in Fox had not
overruled Davis, pointing out that an en banc
decision of the Court of Appeals would be necessary for such a result. Thus the Court today
categorizes as a 'law of the United States' a
82 See, e.g., People ex rel. Soto v. United States,
504 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1974).

decision which is still open to question within
the Court of Appeals' own jurisdiction.S3
When the Ninth Circuit receives Davis' Section 2255 motion on remand it will face exactly the same issue it decided upon appeal, the
application and interpretation of the decision
in Gutknecht to the facts of Davis. Thus, although the Fox decision intervened, the Ninth
Circuit may refuse to follow Fox when it
considers the merits of petitioner's Section 2255
motion. Such inconsistent decisions by different appellate panels within a circuit are perfectly permissible. 84 Only an en banc hearing
of the Ninth Circuit would resolve this conflict, but the Supreme Court's remand did not
mandate such a hearing.
By categorizing this type of decision as a
change in law sufficient to merit an appeal
under section 2255, the Court in Davis substantially broadened the grounds available for
relief. Not only is a change in law now sufficient for section 2255 purposes, but the change
need not bind the district court hearing the
motion. In addition, although the inconsistent
change in law in the Davis case came within
the same circuit, Justice Rehnquist suggested
that a decision from the Fourth Circuit, for
example, may allow a section 2255 motion in
the Ninth Circuit.83 The result would be prisoners searching among the circuits to find a
more liberal interpretation of a rule or statute
which would enable them to raise an effective
section 2255 motion. Intra-circuit conflicts
might allow prisoners convicted under the
stricter decision to use the more liberal rule to
obtain relief. All of these contingencies may
not develop, but the possibility certainly remains under the Davis opinion.
A requirement that the subsequent decision
changing the lav be binding upon the court
hearing the section 2255 motion would limit
the effect of the Davis decision.8 G The majority in Davis addressed the issue of authorita83 417 U.S. at 360 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
84 In Davis the panel consisted of Circuit

Judges Chambers and Kilkenny along with District Judge Powell. Circuit Judges Merrell and
Duniway and District Judge Crocker made up the
panel in Fox.
85 417 U.S. at 361 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86 See Comment, Subsequent Inconsistent Interpretation of a Statute as a Basis for Collateral
Attacks by Federal Prisoners, 88 HARV. L REv.
213 (1974).
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tiveness only insofar as they held that the Fox
decision permitted a motion to be raised under
section 2255. Fox, however, as noted by Justice
Rehnquist, did not control the decision in
Davis. Therefore, if courts were to require a
controlling change in law before permitting a
motion under section 2255, a further modification of Davis would develop.
One can read Davis as allowing a non-authoritative change in law to permit a section
2255 motion only when the change occurred in
the same circuit. This interpretation of the
Davis decision would maintain the independent
character of the various circuits. Even accepting this latter reading of the Davis decision,
however, intra-circuit conflicts between panels
would still pose problems. The district court
when hearing Davis' motion on remand, may
refuse to follow the Fox decision and summarily dismiss the motion. Such a procedure would
be a superfluous exercise for the prisoner and
the courts.
With reference to the second standard, the
effect of the change in law upon petitioner's
case is also an area open to questions. If the
court applied the Fox decision in the Davis
case, it would then release Davis. Limiting
Davis to cases where application of the subsequent change in law would result in release
would impose a further constraint on the impact of the Davis decision. Such a reading of
the Davis opinion finds support in the language of the Davis majority:
In this case, the petitioner's contention is that
the decision in Gutknecht . . . as interpreted
... in the Fox case ... established that his induction order was invalid under the Selective
Service Act and that he could not be lawfully
convicted for failure to comply with that
order. If this contention is well-taken, then
Davis' conviction and punishment are for an
act that the law does not make criminal.
There can be no room for doubt that such a
circumstance 'inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice' and 'presents exceptional circumstances' that justify collateral relief under § 2255.87
Thus the language in the Davis opinion supports a position that if a subsequent change in
law would result in a finding that the actions
for which the person was convicted are no
87 417 U.S. at 346.
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longer criminal, then relief under section 2255
would be available. Allowing relief in these situations fulfills the command of Hia that a
"fundamental defect" or "exceptional circumstances" be present.
The question then remains whether the facts
of Davis truly represent the limit of the holding. A subsequent change in law could apply
to a petitioner, yet it might not result in his
complete release. Such a situation would arise
when, for example, a subsequent decision established a new test for criminal responsibility.
The change, if applied to petitioner's case,
would require a new trial, perhaps long after
the alleged crime. If the change is constitutional and applies retroactively, 8 then an adequate motion under section 2255 could be
raised since all constitutional claims may be
raised on collateral attack.89
If the change in law is statutory, however,
the court need not grant a motion under section 2255 even if the change applies retroactively. The Davis decision did not require that
courts allow every change in law to suffice for
the purposes of section 2255. The Supreme
Court only indicated that the facts of Davis
permitted a motion under section 2255. Several
cases following Davis provide some indication
of the direction in which the courts are moving and of the considerations they are taking
into account when deciding whether to allow a
motion under section 2255 after a change in law.
88
Justice Rehnquist contended that retroactivity
of a subsequent change in law was not required
for a sufficient motion under § 2255. The majority
however, specifically stated that the retroactivity
of Gutknecht is yet to be decided. Later cases
citing Davis refer to retroactivity as an essential
element for relief under § 2255.
89 Justice Black argued in his dissent in Kaufinun that not every constitutional claim may be
sufficient for collateral relief. He pointed to the
language of § 2255 which requires that there be
"such a denial or infringment of the constitutional
rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment
vulnerable to collateral attack." From this language he concluded that not every constitutional
claim is "such a denial" of rights. Black contended
that before Mapp almost every constitutional violation "played a central role in assuring that the
trial would be a reliable means of testing guilt."
394 U.S. at 237 (Black, J., dissenting). Black,
then, would exclude fourth amendment attacks
from § 2255 relief and require a claim that would
cast some doubt on the guilt of the petitioner. See
also Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral
Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cur. L.
REv. 142 (1970).
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Quinn v. United States9o and Joe v. United

States9 ' both concerned the application of the
Supreme Court decision in Keeble v. United
States9 2 to cases tried and finalized prior to
this decision. Both Quinn and Joe were Indians who were convicted under the Major
Crimes Act. Prior to Keeble, courts had construed this statute strictly, preventing trial
courts from giving lesser included offense instructions to the jury. Courts reasoned that
they had jurisdiction only over those offenses
specifically enumerated in the Major Crimes
Act, and therefore, they deemed it beyond their
jurisdiction to provide instructions on other
crimes not listed in the act. Thus neither
Quinn nor Joe had the benefit of these lesser
included offense instructions at trial and were
convicted of the major crime.93 The Keeble decision, coming after their convictions and unsuccessful appeals, held that a statute which required that Indians be tried just like state
criminals, required a court to give lesser included offense instructions at trial. The Court
held that a federal district judge with jurisdiction over an enumerated offense also has jurisdiction over non-enumerated offenses that fall
within the lesser included offense category.
The Keeble Court reasoned that denial of this
right to lesser included offense instructions
would present serious constitutional difficulties.
The Tenth Circuit when considering Joe's
subsequent section 2255 motion recognized
that "Keeble avowedly did not establish any
new constitutional doctrine" and also that Joe's
"conviction, affirmed on appeal, was, to be
sure, in consonance with contemporaneous interpretations of § 1153." 94 Yet, applying Keeble retroactively, the Tenth Circuit permitted
Joe's section 2255 motion. They read the
Davis opinion as reminding "us that the statute [Section 2255] was designed to empower a
sentencing court to correct a judgment to conform to an intervening change in the law affecting the fundamental rights of a convicted
defendant." o5 Thus the court in Joe required a
90 499 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1974).
91510 F2d 1038 (10th Cir. 1975).
n2412 U.S. 205 (1973), rev'g 459 F.2d 757 (10th
Cir. 1972).
O3Joe was charged with rape, whereas Quinn
was charged with larceny.
510 F. 2d at 1042.
95 Id.

retroactive application of the change in law
and further required that the change affect a
fundamental right of the convicted defendant.99
The Tenth Circuit also found significant the
fact that Joe had exhausted his appellate procedures on this precise issue. The court in Joe
recognized that had Joe's case been heard
eleven months later, when the Keeble case was
granted certiorari, the court would have certainly applied the Keeble decision. Since Joe
had argued the propriety of lesser included offense instructions on appeal and in his petition
for a writ of certiorari, the Tenth Circuit
held the subsequent decision in Keeble should
apply to Joe's case. Therefore, when the alleged error is statutory, the Tenth Circuit interpreted Davis to require that a petitioner
must have exhausted his appellate remedies before requesting relief-under section 2255 due
to a subsequent change in law.
In contrast to Joe, the Eighth Circuit in
Quinn denied retroactive application of the
Keeble decision in that circuit. However, they
affirmed "the district court order denying
Quinn's Section 2255 motion for another
reason. " 97 They found Quinn's failure to
request a lesser included offense instruction
fatal to his claim. Unlike Keeble, Quinn was
entitled to a lesser included offense instruction
at his trial since, according to the Eighth Circuit, the offense he committed was specifically
enumerated in the federal statute. Thus the
court of appeals did not see Keeble as changing the law as applied to the facts of Quinn.
The thrust of the opinion, however, indicated
that retroactivity of a change in law is essential
and that exhaustion of remedies and procedures at trial and through appeal is also
98
necessary.
Finally, United States v. Travers9 0 deals
9
6 Keeble did not consider a constitutional claim,
but it did allow lesser included offense instructions
by interpreting § 1153 to avoid constitutional difficulties which the court thought might develop if
the denial of lesser included offense instructions
continued.
97 499 F.2d at 795.
98 The court clearly implied that denial of retroactive effect to Keeble in that circuit was enough
to defeat a § 2255 motion. The fact that Quinn
failed to ask for the proper instructions and was,
therefore, denied relief indicates, moreover, the desire of the court to have defendants exhaust appellate remedies.
99 No. 74-1737 (2d Cir., December 16, 1974).
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with the precise issue raised by Justice
Rehnquist in his dissent in Davis concerning
the effect of United States v. Maze'00 on prior
convictions for mail fraud. The Maze decision
relied on a narrow construction of the federal
conspiracy law recognized by a minority of
federal circuits prior to Maze. Justice Rehnquist predicted that the Davis opinion would
seem "to provide full opportunity for all defendants convicted under the Mail Fraud Act
in the circuits whose view was not accepted to
relitigate those convictions in a section 2255
proceeding." 101 Travers was just such a proceeding.
Travers was convicted of mail fraud under
the broad interpretation of the mail fraud statute applied by a majority of the circuits prior
to Maze. At the time of the Maze decision
Travers had already served his sentence, and
therefore had brought a writ in error coram
nobis. The court in Travers acknowledged that
Davis involved section 2255, but they noted
that the "standards applied in federal coram
nobis are similar" to those of section 2255.102
Thus they looked to Davis to determine the
effect of Maze on the conviction of Travers.
The court found that Davis clearly permitted
an attack on a conviction by a section 2255
motion when a subsequent change occurred in
the laws of the United States. However, the
court also contended that the Davis opinion left
open the question of a requirement of retroactivity. In support of this view, they pointed to
a footnote in Davis which read:
In the absence of a decision by the Court of
Appeals on the merits of the petitioner's contentions, this case is not an appropriate vehicle
to consider whether the Gutknecht decision
has retroactive application or whether the Fox
case was correctly decided by the Court of
03
Appeals.'
Thus the Second Circuit in Travers contended
that the Ninth Circuit in the Davis case had
not yet determined whether Gutknecht should
be applied retroactively. The implication is that
a decision denying retroactivity to Gutknecht
would preclude relief for Davis under section
2255 since the change in law promulgated by
100414 U.S. 395 (1974).

101 417 U.S. at 366 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102

No. 74-1734 at page 808, n.1.

103 417 U.S. at 341 n.12.
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the Gutknecht decision would then be inapplicable to petitioner's case.
Linkletter v. Walker 0 4 established certain
standards for determining the retroactivity of
any new law. These criteria are: (1) the purpose to be served by the new law, (2) the extent of reliance upon the old standard, and (3)
the effect of the new standard upon the administration of justice. Courts, therefore, must test
each change of law against these criterea and
determine if the new law should apply to prior
cases. Once a court determines that a change
in law should apply retroactively, however,
such determination does not guarantee a successful motion under section 2255. The Travers court went beyond retroactivity and required other factors to be present before
granting relief under section 2255. The manner in which the Travers court handled petitioner's claim after granting retroactivity to
the Maze decision delineates these factors.
Looking to Maze, the Travers court found
that the "Maze decision was no thunderclap like
those that have given rise to Supreme Court
rulings limiting the temporal effect of constitutional decisions on criminal procedure.... 105
Thus the Travers court held the Maze decision
to be retroactive in the Second Circuit and
proceeded to deal with its effect on Travers'
conviction.
Two factors strongly influenced the court to
grant Travers relief in this case. First, in view
of Maze, Travers was convicted and punished
for an act that the law did not now make
criminal. 10 This type of change made prior
104381 U.S. 618 (1965). Courts have denied
retroactive effect to cases such as Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) which established significant
extensions of constitutional rights and whose effect
would be enormous. Where the change is not so
dramatic, or where the purpose of the new enactment is essential, courts will give retroactive effect
to a new development in the law.
A finding of retroactivity is an essential initial
step to a successful motion under § 2255 based
upon a change in law. If the court grants retroactivity to a new decision then the question still remains whether the court should grant § 2255 relief
based upon this new law. Although some criteria
may overlap, the question of retroactivity and the
sufficiency of the § 2255 motion are two separate
determinations for the court.
105 No. 74-1737 at 810.
106 The government argued that they could have
proven the elements of conspiracy but thought it
unnecessary due to the statutory construction then
in effect in that circuit. To allow § 2255 relief
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convictions under the statute "inherently result
in a complete miscarriage of justice" and
"present exceptional circumstances" which justify relief under section 2255.107 The fact that
the new interpretation made the punished conduct now totally free from sanctions presented
a clear case of manifest injustice for this
court.
The second factor was Travers' full utilization of the appellate process. Applying the
holding in Sunal v. Large08 to these facts the
court reasoned that:
[W]e must take Sunal as meaning that when
the error is one which can be rectified by
proper construction of a criminal statute without resort to the Constitution, a claim that a
conviction was had without proof of all the
elements required by the statute is not a constitutional claim as that phrase is used in respect of collateral attack, and that, in consequence, collateral relief will rarely be accorded
to those who, even for apparently good reasons,
did not exhaust the possibilities of direct
review.109
This reasoning comports with the other cases
following Davis which have required full use
of appellate procedure in order to raise a statutory claim on a section 2255 motion.
The final argument raised by the Government in Travers may help clarify the precise
nature of the statutory change in law that a
petitioner must assert in order to satisfy a section 2255 motion. The Second Circuit in
0
had held that the
United States v. Tarrago"1
newly developed test for criminal responsibility
established by that circuit in United States v.
Freeman"1' should apply to cases still open to
direct review, thereby implying that this decision would be unavailable for purposes of collateral attack. The government argued that
then, they contended, would free a prisoner who
could have been proven guilty had the government
known that proof of those elements was required.
However, since the alleged acts of Travers were
not criminal after Maze, the court allowed the motion. Travers may have been guilty, but he was
not guilty of the act with which the government
charged him.
107 Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428
(1962).
108332 U.S. 174 (1947).
109 No. 74-1737 at 817.
110 398 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
111 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).

this decision was a precedent for not applying
changes in law retroactively, but the court in
Travers looked to the effect of the change in
law on the case before them. They noted:
Furthermore application of the Freeman rule
to convictions already final would by no
means certainly have resulted in acquittals;
rather it would have led to holding, or attempting to hold, hosts of new trials, in many
instances long after the event."12
Thus the Second Circuit's refusal to apply the
rule in Freeman in cases of collateral attacks
did not bar the Travers court from so applying
the decision in Maze. The Freeman decision
would only allow the defendant the benefit of a
new test for criminal responsibility at trial.
Even with the application of the Freeman decision to a petitioner's case, a new trial would be
necessary to determine the case under the new
test. Applying the Maze decision to a prior
case, however, would reverse a petitioner's
conviction.
The Maze decision established that conduct
for which prisoners had been convicted under
the statutory construction prevalent in most
circuits prior to Maze was no longer criminal.
Thus release was appropriate for prisoners
such as Travers. Such a remedy eases tremendously the administrative burden upon the
criminal justice system by avoiding continued
litigation of petitioner's case. The Travers
court also considered it a grievous violation of
a prisoner's rights to be confined when a new
law has made the conduct for which a prisoner
was convicted no longer criminal.
The decisions following Davis, therefore, indicate that a petitioner must show more than a
mere change in law on some aspect of his case
in order to be successful on a motion under
section 2255. When a petitioner asserts a statutory ground for relief due to a change in law,
courts have required that he initially demonstrate that a court should give retroactive effect to this change.
Additionally, petitioner must demonstrate his
full utilization of direct appellate procedures." 3
2
"1

No. 74-1737 at 820.

113 Courts in the past required a petitioner to

exhaust his appellate procedures before they would
hear a constitutional claim. Kaufman invalidated
this requirement by allowing a constitutional claim
to be raised in a motion under § 2255 even if peti-
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If the grounds of the post-conviction relief are
statutory then courts following Davis have
indicated that petitioner must have raised the
issue on appeal in order for the court to consider it on a motion to vacate judgment under
section 2255.
Finally, the petitioner must show that the
change in law will have a fundamental effect
upon his prior conviction. If the subsequent
change completely invalidates the conviction,
then courts should grant relief. If, however,
the effect of the subsequent change would be to
require a new trial, then the court may deny
relief if it does not consider the violated right
to be fundamental.
Courts will need to develop and discuss this
final point more fully. The court in Joe allowed relief when the remedy available to Joe
would be a new trial with appropriate lesser
included offense instructions given. The decision in Travers, however, required that complete release of the petitioner be the result
when the court applies the new interpretation.
In keeping with the rationales underlying habeas corpus and section 2255 relief, courts still
must look to the decision in Hill for the standard to employ. Habeas corpus and section
2255 were designed to alleviate cases where serious injustice would result by the continued
confinement of the petitioning prisoner. Once a
court has decided that the new law should
apply retroactively, it still must consider the
effect of this change of law upon the petitiontioner had failed to raise it on appeal. Thus courts
following Davis may invalidate this exhaustion
requirement for statutory claims; however, at the
present time courts have indicated that they do
require exhaustion of appellate remedies.
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er's case to see if such serious injustice would
be done by a failure to grant relief. If failure
to apply the subsequent change in law would
produce "fundamental defects which result in a
complete miscarriage of justice," 114 then
courts must grant relief.
People ex rel. Soto v. United States" 5 spoke
in terms of "fundamental rights," an analysis
which may prevail. Under this analysis a
change in law which established that a defendant was denied what courts conclude was a
fundamental right, would require relief. The
court in Travers, however, viewed actual effect
as the key factor to consider in deciding
whether to permit relief. The Travers decision indicates that unlike constitutional attacks
which may be made whatever the effect on the
trial would have been, a statutory claim must
be of such a nature as to result in the release
of the prisoner by applying the new law to petitioner's case.
Whatever the final determination of these issues will be, the cases succeeding Davis have
posited some parameters for the availability of
section 2255 relief, despite the fears of Justice
Rehnquist that courts must now grant unbounded collateral relief. As Judge Friendly
noted in Travers: "Cassandra-like predictions
in dissent are not a sure guide to the breadth
of the majority's ruling. . . ." 116 Davis certainly offers increased availability of federal
post-conviction relief, but it provides this relief
in keeping with the intent of habeas corpusto cure grave injustices when no other remedy
exists.
114

368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962).

115 504 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1974).
116 No. 74-1737 at 810.
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EXCLUSION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE
AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
Today, sixty-one years after the Supreme
Court of the United States first imposed the
"exclusionary rule" on the federal court
system ' and fourteen years after the rule was
made applicable in state courts, 2 the separate
questions of when prosecution evidence is
seized in violation of fourth and fourteenth
amendment rights3 and when it should be inadmissible at a criminal trial remain matters of
controversy. Not only have several justices of
the Supreme Court, including Chief Justice
Berger, expressed misgivings about the exclusionary rule, 4 but recent decisions handed
down by the Court would appear to limit the
application of the rule at criminal trials. 5
I Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 This comment will focus on the application of
the exclusionary rule in preliminary hearings as a
sanction used to enforce the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
found in the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
Although courts have applied the exclusionary rule
to evidence other than the products of unreasonable
searches and seizures-to evidence offered in violation of fifth amendment rights, for example-this
comment will examine cases involving such other
evidence only when they are relevant to consideration of the exclusionary rule's function in the
search and seizure area.
4 See Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau
of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Burger,
C. J. dissenting), in which he proposed that Congress create an alternative to the exclusionary rule.
See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 510 (1971) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), for Justice Blackmun's
view that the fourth amendment supports no exclusionary rule.
5See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973), in which the Court held that in the case
of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the
person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment but is also a
"reasonable" search under that amendment. See
also Schueckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218
(1973), in which the Court was urged to hold that
the legality of a search and seizure by state
officers may not be relitigated in a federal habeas
corpus proceeding. Although the court disposed of
the case by deciding that the search was a consensual one, Chief Justice Berger and Justices Powell
and Rehnquist thought the Court should have held
federal habeas corpus to be unavailable in such
cases. Justice Blackmun concurred in their view

While the Supreme Court has been reconsidering whether the fourth and fourteenth
amendments even require an exclusionary rule,
Congress, the federal courts and many state
courts and legislative bodies have been pondering whether the exclusionary rule, as set forth
in earlier Supreme Court decisions, applies in
all criminal proceedings. 6 Time and again-in
relation to grand jury and post-conviction deliberations, for example-the question has
arisen whether the fourth and fourteenth
amendments require exclusion of evidence at
7
criminal proceedings other than trials.
but thought the question should have been reserved
for decision in another case.
Other limitations have been placed on the applicability of the exclusionary rule in a criminal trial.
In order to challenge the unconstitutionality of a
search and seizure, for example, a defendant must
allege a legitimate interest of some kind in the
premises searched or the materials seized. Brown
v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973). Also, the
exclusionary rule does not prevent the use of evidence to impeach defendants who have chosen to
testify at their own trials. Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
6 For a general discussion of how the exclusionary rule relates to essentially non-criminal proceedings see Note, Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence it No;-Criminal Proceedings, 22
U. FLA. L. REv. 38 (1969).
7With regard to grand jury proceedings, the
Supreme Court held in United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338 (1974), that a witness summoned to
appear and testify before a grand jury could not
refuse to answer questions on the ground that they
were based on evidence obtained from an unlawful
search and seizure. That decision was the latest in
a series of Supreme Court holdings recognizing
the general freedom grand juries have under the
Constitution to consider whatever evidence is
available to them, whether legally or illegally obtained, and whether or not the evidence would be
admissible at a criminal trial. The Supreme Court
has also held that an indictment need not be overturned simply because the grand jury returning it
considered hearsay evidence, Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), or evidence obtained
in violation of the defendanes privilege against
self-incrimination, Lawn v. United States, 355
U.S. 339 (1958). Accord, United States v. Blue,
384 U.S. 251 (1966) (dictum) ; see generally, 8 J.
WIGMoRE, EviDENcE § 2184a (McNaughton rev.
1961) ; R. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 167 n.36 (2d
ed. 1972).
The majority opinion in Costello contained the
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This comment will focus on the exclusion at
'the preliminary hearing of evidence seized in
violation of fourth and fourteenth amendment
rights, giving particular emphasis to state
practices. Under federal statutory law, objections to evidence on the ground that it has

been acquired by unlawful means are not properly made at a federal preliminary hearing.8
While some state courts and legislatures have
adopted a similar rule, 9 a significant number of
other states are allowing exclusion at the preliminary hearing upon motion of the accused. 0

following explanation of why the Supreme Court
declined to establish a rule permitting defendants
in federal criminal cases to challenge indictments
on the ground that they are not supported by adequate or competent evidence:
No persuasive reasons are advanced for establishing such a rule. It would run counter to
the whole history of the grand jury institution, in which laymen conduct their inquiries
unfettered by technical rules. Neither justice
nor the concept of a fair trial requires such a
change. In a trial on the merits, defendants
are entitled to a strict observance of all rules
designed to bring about a fair verdict. Defendants are not entitled, however, to a rule which
would result in interminable delay but add
nothing to the assurance of a fair trial.
350 U.S. at 364.
One constitutional limitation on the power of
grand juries to consider whatever evidence is
available to them is that the fourth and fourteenth
amendments provide protection against a subpoena
duces tecum too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reasonable. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906).
Also, in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970),
Congress enacted a statutory exception to the general federal rule allowing grand juries to consider
illegally obtained evidence. Where evidence has
been obtained by wiretapping or electronic surveilance prohibited by the act, the use of such evidence in any grand jury investigation, or in any
other criminal proceeding at the federal or state
level, is generally prohibited. See Gelbard v.
United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
In states that still retain the grand jury, the
typical rule is that indictments are not voided, despite introduction of evidence which would have
been excluded at trial, as long as sufficient competent evidence to support the indictment was re-

315 F. Supp. 253 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd 435 F.2d 26
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983 (1971),
noted in 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 172 (1971) and 71
COLUM. L. REv. 1102 (1971) (evidence obtained in
violation of fourth amendment can be used at sentencing since need for it outweighs deterrent effect
of excluding such evidence). See also In re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 463 P.2d 734, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382
(1970), in which the court held, despite a strong
dissent, that the exclusionary rule is applicable to
parole revocation proceedings. Justice Tobriner, in
the majority opinion, reasoned that the incremental deterrent effect of not extending the rule to
those proceedings would be less important than the
"social consequences" of extension. The same conclusion was reached in United States ex. rel.
Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir.
1970), noted in 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 111 (1970), although each of the judges deciding the case delivered a separate opinion.
s Rule 5.1 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides in pertinent part:
Objections to evidence on the ground that it
was acquired by unlawful means are not properly made at the preliminary examination.
Motions to suppress must be made to the trial
court.

ceived by the grand jury. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL

CODE § 939.6(b) (West 1970); N.Y. CODE CRIM.
PROC. § 210.35 (McKinney 1958), analyzed in R.
PITLER,

NEW

YORK CRIMINAL

PRACTICE UNDER

THE CPL 400 (1972). Some states also have enacted statutes with provisions that conform generally to those in the section of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act found above. See,
e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-5 (1973) and N.Y.

Civ. PRAc. § 4506(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
With regard to exclusion after conviction, the
few cases on the subject are split. Compare Verdugo v. United States, 402 F.2d 599, 609-13 (9th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 925 (1970)
(where use of illegally seized evidence at sentencing would provide a great incentive to searches
and seizures in violation of the fourth amendment,
the evidence must be disregarded in sentencing)
with Von Pickrell v. People, 163 Colo. 591, 431
P.2d 1003 (1967) and United States v. Schipani,

FED. R. Cnim. P. 5.1 (a).

This rule represents a codification of a longprevailing practice whereby evidence has been considered at federal court preliminary examinations
without regard to the legality of the means by
which it was acquired. Even under the less specific
language found in the statute prior to its amendment in 1972, a federal magistrate had no authority
in a preliminary hearing to determine the admissibility of illegally seized evidence. FED. R. Cem. P.
5.1 (Advisory Committee Notes); Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
9 For statutory and quasi-statutory state law directly prohibiting exclusion at the preliminary
hearing see, e.g., 17 ARIz. R. Casm. P. 5.3(b)
(1973) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. 971-31(5) (b) (1971).
For state cases directly and indirectly opposing exclusion at the preliminary hearing see, e.g., Davis v.
State, 65 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1953); Thompson v.
General Finance Co., 205 Kan. 76, 468 P.2d 269
(1970); State v. Earley, 192 Kan. 167, 386 P.2d
189 (1963) ; McIntyre v. Sands, 128 Kan. 521, 278
P. 761 (1929); State v. Crouch, 353 S.W.2d 597
(Mo. 1962); Ex parte Cloud, 18 S.W.2d 562
(Mo. 1929) ; Delay v. Brainard, 182 Neb. 509, 156
N.W.2d 14 (1968); Harmer v. State, 120 Neb.
374, 238 N.W. 356 (1931); State v. Garcia, 79
N.M. 367, 443 P.2d 860 (1968); State v. Harris,
44 Okla. Crim. 116, 279 P. 925 (1929) ; McCurdy
v. State, 39 Okla. Crim. 310, 264 P. 925 (1928).
10 For state statutes authorizing exclusion at the
preliminary hearing see CAL. EvID. CODE § 300
(West 1966) ; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(f)
(West 1954) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 109-3(e),
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STATE PRACTICES

Since state courts and legislatures have
been operating under the exclusionary rule imposed by Mapp, state developments must be
seen from the point of view of diverse and
conflicting pressures. On the one hand, there is
the pressure to conform to the viewpoint of the
Supreme Court, which has recognized only a
limited constitutional right to a preliminary hearing 1 ' and has refrained from holding that the
exclusionary rule applies at such proceedings. On
the other hand, there is the pressure generated
by the widely held conviction that states can go
further than the Supreme Court in furnishing
rights to the accused; that states can be laboratories of reform ultimately providing the Supreme Court with the data necessary for the
reexamination of its own policies.
In coping with these competing pressures,
courts and legislatures within various states
have come into conflict over the relative merits
of arguments for and against exclusion at the
preliminary hearing. State legislatures have
114-12 (1973). For state cases lending support
to exclusion at the preliminary hearing see e.g.,
State v. Jacobson, 106 Ariz. 129, 471 P.2d 1021
(1970); Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d
812, 330 P.2d 39 (1958); Rogers v. Superior
Court, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 291 P.2d 929 (1955) ; Pinnizzotto v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d 582, 65
Cal. Rptr. 74 (1968); Hernandez v. Superior
Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 20, 299 P.2d 678 (1956) ;
People v. Schuber, 71 Cal. App. 2d 773, 163 P.2d
498 (1945); State v. Wilson, 55 Haw. 314, 519
P.2d 228 (1974) ; Martinez v. State, 90 Idaho 229,
409 P.2d 426 (1965) ; People v. Taylor, 50 Ill. 2d
136, 277 N.E2d 878 (1972) ; People v. Asta, 337
Mich. 590, 60 N.W.2d 472 (1953); People v.
Maire, 42 Mich. App. 32, 201 N.W.2d 318 (1972) ;
Goldsmith v. Sheriff, 85 Nev. 295, 454 P.2d 86
(1969); People ex rel. Ruppert v. Hoy, 50 Misc.
2d 326, 270 N.Y.S.2d 647, aff'd 25 App. Div. 2d
884, 270 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1966); People v. Weiss,
147 Misc. 595, 261 N.Y.S. 646 (Mag. Ct. 1932).
'ZThe Supreme Court has rejected the contention that all accused persons have a constitutional
right to a preliminary hearing ever since Lem
Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913). Recently,
however, the Court did hold that the fourth amendment requires a preliminary hearing as a prerequisite to an "extended restraint of liberty" prior
to trial. Gerstein v. Pugh, -U.S-,
95 S.Ct.
854, 863 (1975). The Gerstein Court refused to
overturn Lent Woon, holding that a preliminary
hearing is not a prerequisite to prosecution by
information (or, presumably, by indictment). Id. at
865. A preliminary hearing is required only for
those suspects who suffer restraint on liberty other
than simply the condition that they appear for
trial. Id. at 869 n.26.

passed laws on the subject only to have them
declared void by state courts. Courts in turn
have allowed exclusion, or favored it in dicta,
only to have legislatures pass laws specifically
opposing it. Consideration of how state courts
and legislatures who have participated in the
debate on exclusion have decided the matter for
their states is important to any assessment of
the viability of applying the exclusionary rule
at the preliminary hearing and the likelihood
of its application in a greater number of states
and, ultimately, the federal system.
This comment's survey of state practices
with regard to exclusion at the preliminary
hearing opens with the recent decision of State
v. Wilson, 12 a Hawaiian case which not only
contains an unusually thoughtful discussion of
the considerations that favor and oppose exclusion but also provides an excellent picture of a
state court struggling to determine the role it
should play under the Constitution in extending rights to accused persons. In Wilson, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii decided an appeal
by the prosecution from a ruling of a state district court that it had jurisdiction to entertain
a motion to suppress at a preliminary hearing.
Appellees were charged, pursuant to an information, with promotion of a detrimental drug.
A preliminary hearing was held, where the
state called its only witness, a police sergeant,
who testified regarding the execution of a
search warrant upon appellees' residence. After
the State had presented its case, the court
granted appellees' motion to suppress on the
grounds that the warrant was an illegal "blanket" warrant.13
The district court based its holding that it
had jurisdiction to entertain the motion to suppress on rule 46(e) of Hawaii's District
Court Rules of Penal Procedure. 4 On appeal,
however, the Supreme Court of Hawaii
pointed out that the rule in question allowed
motions to suppress to be made only before the
court having jurisdiction to try the offense.
12

13
14

55 Haw. 314, 519 P.2d 228 (1974).
Id. at 519 P.2d at 229.
This rule states in pertinent part:
MOTION FOR RETURN OF PROPERTY AND TO

SUPPRESS EVIDENCE. A person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure may move the
court having jurisdiction to try the offense for
the return of the property, or to suppress for
use as evidence anything so obtained.
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Since the crime that appellees were charged
with was a felony,15 punishable by a maximum
five-year term of imprisonment,' 6 and since, by
state law, district courts in Hawaii did not
7
have jurisdiction to try felony cases,' the dis-

trict court did not have jurisdiction to try the
offense charged in Wilson. For that reason,
the Supreme Court of Hawaii ruled that the
district court did not have jurisdiction under8
rule 46(e) to entertain a motion to suppress.1
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, however, did
not hold that the district court's exclusion of
the evidence was erroneous. Instead, it upheld
the exclusion and dismissal even though they
were based upon "ttechnically inaccurate authority." ' 9 The court reasoned that a state district court, in conducting a preliminary hearing, must adhere to the general rules of
evidence, which include objection to the admissibility of unconstitutionally seized evidence.
According to the court, a district court judge
is also bound by his oath of office to uphold
the constitutions of the United States and Hawaii. Consequently, the exclusionary rule must
also be upheld, even at the preliminary hearing, as a sanction essential to enforcing the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
20
searches and seizures.
(Supp.
15HAwAi REv. LAWS § 712-1247(2)
1974).
10 HawAir REv. LAWS § 706-660 (1968).
iTHAwAii REv. LAWS § 604-8 (Supp. 1974).
519 P.2d at 230.
is id. at.,
19 Id.

20 ld., citing State v. Pokini, 45 Haw. 295, 367

P.2d 499 (1961). In that case, the Supreme Court
of Hawaii, recognizing the special position the exclusionary rule has always occupied in Hawaii,
stated:
It is noteworthy that on the specific question
of admissibility of evidence, debate was had in
the [state] Constitutional Convention on June
5, 1950 . . . on an amendment which would

have added the words: Evidence obtained in
violation of this section (incorporating the
exact language of the Fourth Amendment)

shall not be admissible in any court against
any person. That amendment was substituted
out of fear that this state would . . . follow

states holding against the exclusionary rule of
Weeks....

There was no division among the

delegates in their desire to follow the federal
decisions but only as to how that was to be
accomplished. The problem was resolved by an
instruction that the Committee of the Whole
Report contain the explanation . . . [that the

incorporation of the exact words of the fourth
amendment was intended to give to the state
the benefit of the federal decisions construing

To enable Hawaii's district courts to enforce
the exclusionary rule at preliminary hearings
despite lack of jurisdiction to hear motions to
suppress, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held in
Wilson that a motion to suppress is essentially
the same as a motion to strike when dealing
with the admissibility of evidence. On dubious
authority, 2 ' the court held that notwithstanding
the label attached to the motion in the Wilson
case, the court would treat it as a motion to
strike and would affirm.

22

the same]; the amendment was withdrawn.
This being the situation, it is evident that the
ruling of the Supreme Court of the United
States on June 19, 1961 (Mapp . . .).....
holding the states to the exclusionary rule of
Weeks, signifies no change in this State, for
we were committed to that course from the
date this State was admitted. Previously, of
course, our Territorial status brought us directly under the Fourth Amendment. Territory v. Ho Me, 26 Haw. 331 (1922).
45 Haw. at 308-09, 367 P.2d at 506. There is
some question, in view of the above, whether Pokini really supports the majority's position in Wilson. Although the language of the proposed
amendment to the state constitution ("shall not be
admissible in any court against any person") favored allowing exclusion at the preliminary hearing, this amendment was withdrawn. The explanation for withdrawal by the Committee of the
Whole (giving the state "the benefit of Federal
decisions") seems to cut against exclusion at preliminary hearings, since federal decisions do not
require such exclusion.
It should be noted that the Wilson court cited
Rule 5(d) (2) of Hawaii's Rules of Criminal Procedure, Laws 1970, Act 188, § 39, as a basis for its
decision that exclusion was proper at the preliminary hearing. 55 Haw. at_ 519 P2d at 230. However, this rule provided only that a district court
had the power to conduct a preliminary hearing,
hear evidence, and discharge a defendant should
probable cause not appear from the evidence adduced. The dissent of Justice Ogata demonstrated
effectively that this rule could not provide support
for21the court's opinion. Id. at _ 519 P2d at 231.
Riddle v. State, 257 Ind. 501, 275 N.E.2d 788
(1971), where the Supreme Court of Indiana held
that the defendant had preserved for review the
question of whether probable cause had existed for
a magistrate to issue a warrant to search the defendant's room, by timely objection to the introduction of the disputed evidence at trial. The Wilson court cited Riddle for the court's dictum that
"the admissibility of evidence secured under a
search warrant can be challenged either before
trial in a pre-trial motion to suppress, or at trial
by timely objection or motion to strike." Id. at
504, 275 N.E.2d at 790.
.2255 Haw. at .- , 519 P.2d at 231. Here the
state supreme court was not in conflict with the
state legislature, a phenomenon common in other
states, since the supreme court itself, and not the
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In a footnote to its opinion, the court rejected the argument by the state that in future
cases it would be forced to take direct appeal
to the Supreme Court of Hawaii or otherwise
be bound by the decision of the district court
on exclusion (res judicata). The court noted
that since a preliminary hearing in the district
court is only the initial stage of criminal proceedings, the trial court has jurisdiction after
indictment to consider de novo the issue of admissibility of evidence and is not bound by the
28
decision of the district court.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Ogata
struck at the heart of the court's opinion by
criticizing what he believed to be the court's
lack of understanding of the interests properly
protected by the exclusionary rule. It was Ogata's view that the rule, as enunciated in
Weeks, Mapp, and other Supreme Court decisions, applies only to proceedings involving an
adjudication of guilt or innocence. 24 Very recently, he noted,25 the Supreme Court had even
stated as much:
Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to
proscribe the use of illegally-seized evidence it
all proceedings or against all persons. As with
any remedial device, the application of the
rule has been restricted to those areas where
its remedial objectives are thought most
28
efficaciously served.
Justice Ogata construed the "remedial objective" of the rule, and the implied interest to be
protected by it, to be the necessity for an effec7
tive deterrent to illegal police action. Justice
Ogata then contended that the exclusionary rule
is not concerned with an attempt to redress the
particular wrong done to the victim of an unconstitutional search. 28 It seemed to him that exlegislature, promulgated the rule of procedure that
allowed motions to suppress to be made only
before the court having jurisdiction to try the
offense. HAwAII REv. LAWS §§ 5602-21 (1968).
23 55 Haw. at n.5, 519 P2d at 231 n.5. Appeal was not precluded, however.
24 Id.at -, 519 P.2d at 232.
25 Id.

26 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974).
27 55 Haw. at 519 P.2d at 232. Justice Ogata
cited as authority Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 636-37 (1965).
2855 Haw. at _, 519 P.2d at 232. For further
authority see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.

clusion occurs "far too late to be serviceable as
a protective device assuring the privacy of the
particular individual. . . .,29 Instead, he focused on the goal of deterring unlawful police
conduct and came to the conclusion that no
valid considerations support the entertaining of
motions to suppress at preliminary hearings
since this procedure could in no way be important to deterrence.30
Looking at the relative disadvantages to society and the defendant, Justice Ogata felt that
the interest of all citizens in the maximization
of administrative efficiency opposed exclusion
at the preliminary hearing.3 1 He also contended that from the accused's point of view
such a practice would not be advisable. Citing
Blue, Lawn, and Calandra2 he pointed out that
a prosecutor could obtain an indictment by a
grand jury with excluded evidence because
lower standards prevail for admissibility of evidence before a grand jury. For that reason,
he predicted, prosecutors would seek to avoid
any preliminary hearing to the extent the law
allowed, with the consequence that the accused
at 438: "In sum, the rule is a judicially-created
remedy designed to safeguard fourth amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather
than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved."
:2955

Haw. at __, 519 P.2d at 232.

30 Id. at _, 519 P.2d at 233. In light of the provision in Hawaii's rule 46(e), supra note 14, Justice
Ogata formally dissented only on the ground that,
until Hawaiian law could be changed, exclusion at
a preliminary hearing before a court other than
one having jurisdiction to try the case was improper. Justice Ogata's suggestion for change in
the law was adoption of the federal rule. Id.at_
519 P2d at 235. See note 8 supra.
a'55 Haw. at ___, 519 P.2d at 233. This was one

of the reasons given for the enacting of the federal
statute prohibiting exclusion at the preliminary
hearing. See Committee Note to Rule 5.1, supra
note 8.
a2 55 Haw. at ___, 519 P2d at 233. See Chung v.
Ogata, 53 Haw. 395, 495 P.2d 26 (1972), a case in
which the Supreme Court of Hawaii ruled that the
right to a preliminary hearing may be cut off by
return of an indictment, there being no violation of
the fourteenth amendment in such a procedure.
Justice Ogata was involved in the Chung case when
he was sitting on the circuit court bench. Apparently, he believed then that there was a constitutional violation involved in curtailing the preliminary hearing, for he forced the state to seek a
writ of prohibition from the supreme court to
prohibit him from preventing the state from seeking an'indictment prior to the holding of a preliminary hearing in the case.

COMMENTS
would lose important benefits usually derived
33
from the preliminary hearing.
33 55 Haw. at -,
519 P.2d at 233. Justice Ogata
thought that two serious consequences for the
accused flow from a policy of avoiding preliminary
hearings. First, the accused loses both an opportunity for some early discovery of the nature of
the case against him and also the occasion to create
and preserve evidence for future use-as impeachment material, for example. Id. at _-- 519 P.2d
at 234, citing Coleman v. Burnett, 155 U.S. App.
D.C. 302, 477 F.2d 1187, 1198-1200 (1973) and
State v. Faafiti, 54 Haw. 637, 641 n.4, 413 P.2d 697,
701 n.4 (1973). See 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 5.1.02 [11 (2d ed. Cipes 1970, Supp. 1971), which
states in pertinent part:
Although the purpose of the preliminary hearing seems to be confined to avoidance of unreasonable pretrial detention, its function is
somewhat broader. In practice, the preliminary
hearing may serve as a valuable device to discover the prosecution's case, particularly in
the absence of other means of pretrial discovery.
Second, the accused loses the opportunity to have
a determination made as to probable cause as soon
as possible. 55 Haw. at _
519 P.2d at 234.
Some states allow prosecutors to avoid preliminary hearings under circumstances analogous to
those described in 18 U.S.C. § 3060(e) (1970),
which provides as follows:
No preliminary examination in compliance
with subsection (a) of this section shall be required to be accorded an arrested person, nor
shall such arrested person be discharged from
custody or from the requirement of bail or
any other condition of release pursuant to
subsection (d), if at any time subsequent to
the initial appearance of such person before a
judge or magistrate and prior to the date
fixed for the preliminary examination pursuant
to subsections (b) and (c) an indictment is
returned or, in appropriate cases, an information is filed against such person in a Court of
the United States.
Other states allow omission of the preliminary
hearing only after indictment or upon information.
The fear that prosecutors will avoid preliminary
hearings has had a great influence on federal law.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1 (Advisory Committee
Notes), which states in pertinent part:
A grand jury indictment may properly be
based upon hearsay evidence. . . . This being
so, there is practical advantage in making the
evidentiary requirements for the preliminary
examination as flexible as they are for the
grand jury. Otherwise, there will be increased
pressure upon United States Attorneys to
abandon the preliminary examination in favor
of the grand jury indictment.

For the same reason, subdivision (a) also
provides that the preliminary examination is
not the proper place to raise the issue of illegally obtained evidence....
. . "The Congress has decided that a preliminary examination shall not be required when
there is a grand jury indictment. Increasing
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Justice Ogata also criticized the manner in
which the court chose to implement its decision,
by treating a motion to suppress as a motion to
strike. Justice Ogata contended that conceptual
differences exist between motions to strike and
motions to suppress that should not become
blurred.3 4 The motion to suppress, he said,
urges exclusion because of the manner in
which the evidence was obtained (a collateral
issue), 35 while the motion to strike is used as
an "after-objection" following the inadvertent
admission of evidence that is "inherently excludable" (because of non-responsiveness of the
answer, incompetence, immateriality, privilege
or hearsay). 3 6
the procedural and evidentiary requirements
applicable to the preliminary examination will
therefore add to the administration pressure to
avoid the preliminary examination.
That federal prosecutors often avoid preliminary
hearings is evident from cases such as United
States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1968);
United States v. Quinn, 357 F. Supp. 1348 (N.D.
Ga. 1973) ; and United States ex rel. Wheeler v.
Flood, 269 F. Supp. 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). In
Note, The Function of the PreliminaryHearing in
Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 YALE L.J. 771,

787-8 (1974), the author estimates that only one
of every six cases in federal courts in which a
preliminary hearing could be held actually involves
a preliminary hearing, and that waiver accounts
for only a small fraction of the remaining cases.
For a case in which state prosecutors skipped a
preliminary hearing pursuant to a state practice
allowing such action see Gerstein v. Pugh,
U.S.

-

95 S.Ct. 854 (1975).

Haw. at _, 519 P.2d at 234. Justice Ogata
explained away Riddle, supra note 21, the only case
the majority cited for its interpretation of motions
to strike, claiming that the issue dealt with in the
portion of the case quoted by the majority was not
the issue in Wilson. In Riddle, he correctly noted,
the Indiana court merely stated that unconstitutionally obtained evidence should be excluded
either before trial by a motion to suppress or during trial by a motion to strike.
34 55

,5 55 Haw. at ___ 519 P.2d at 235.
36 Id. See R. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE

§ 52 (2d ed.
1972), which states in pertinent part:
Usually, in the taking of testimony of a witness an objection is apparent as soon as the
question is asked, since the question is likely
to indicate that it calls for inadmissible evidence. But sometimes an objection before an
answer to a question is not feasible. In all
these cases, an 'after-objection' may be stated
as soon as the ground appears. The proper
technique for such an objection is to phrase
a motion to strike out the objectionable evidence, and to request an instruction to the
jury to disregard the evidence. Counsel should
use the term 'motion to strike' as just indicated ....
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In other jurisdictions where courts and legislatures have considered whether evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure
should be excluded at a preliminary hearing,
discussions have not been as extensive as in
Hawaii. In fact, there are few clear decisions
in other jurisdictions as to whether exclusion
is allowed. Statutes dealing with the subject
are rare and judicial opinion regarding exclusion has primarily been voiced in dicta.
Of the jurisdictions besides Hawaii in which
the decision has apparently been made to allow
exclusion at the preliminary hearing, California and Illinois have laid down the clearest
rules. In California, the entire state evidence
code is applicable to all criminal proceedings
except grand jury deliberations.3 7 Evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing must be
such as would be admissible at a criminal
trial.3 There is also a provision in the California Penal Code specifically providing that the
motion to return property or suppress evidence
may be made at the preliminary hearing in the
municipal or justice court if the property or
evidence to be suppressed relates to a felony
offense initiated by a complaint 9 or a misde40
meanor filed together with a felony.
While the California rule on exclusion undoubtedly has constitutional roots in the fourth
and fourteenth amendments, 4 ' case discussions
37 CAL. EVm. CODE § 300 (West 1966) states:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, this
code applies in every action before the Supreme Court or a district court of appeal, superior court, municipal court, or justice court,
including proceedings in such actions conducted by a referee, court commissioner, or
similar officer, but does not apply in grand
jury proceedings.
38 Hernandez v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App.
2d 20, 299 P.2d 678 (1956) ; People v. Schuber, 71
Cal.
App. 2d 773, 163 P.2d 498 (1945).
3
0 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (f)
(West 1954).
Persons accused of a felony are guaranteed preliminary hearings by CAL. PENAL CODE § 859b.
(West Supp. 1974).
40CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(g) (West 1954).
The same provision declares that if the property
or evidence to be suppressed relates to a misdemeanor complaint not filed with a felony (one
triable by the municipal or justice court), the motion to suppress shall be made in the municipal or
justice court before trial and heard prior to trial
at a special hearing considering the validity of the
search
or seizure.
41
See the concurring opinion of Judge Carter
in Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 820,
330 P.2d 39, 44 (1958).

of the rule tend to emphasize the statutory requirement rather than the constitutional necessity for exclusion. An example of such discussion is from People v. Schuber:
The proof which will authorize a magistrate
in holding an accused person for trial must
consist of legal, competent evidence. No other
type of evidence may be considered by the
magistrate. The rules of evidence require the
"production of legal evidence" and the exclusion of "whatever is not legal" [citations
omitted]. The constitutional guarantee of due
process of law requires adherence to the
adopted and recognized rules of evidence.
There cannot be one rule of evidence for the
trial of cases and another rule of evidence for
preliminary examinations. The rule for the admission or rejection of evidence is the same
for both proceedings .... The rule which requires less evidence at a preliminary examination, or even slight evidence, merely goes to
the quantum, sufficiency or weight of evidence
and not to its competency, relevancy or
42
character.
The best expression of doubt of the necessity
for exclusion at the preliminary hearing in
California is that of the dissenting judge in
Priestly v. Superior Court.43 He saw the exclusionary rule as the basis for the California
system of exclusion, 44 but he believed the rule
was inapplicable to preliminary hearings. Citing Costello for the proposition that the rule is
not applicable to grand jury proceedings, he
reasoned that the Supreme Court would not
apply the rule to any pretrial proceeding.45 He
also pointed out that no right to a preliminary
hearing was guaranteed by the federal Constitution. 46
The issue of whether a suppression order of
a judge or magistrate at the preliminary hearing should be binding in later criminal proceedings arose in California, as it did in Hawaii. California's penal code provides that the
state may seek a new complaint or an indictment if,after granting a motion to suppress at
the preliminary hearing, a magistrate or judge
should find no probable cause on which to hold
-271 Cal. App. 2d at 775-76, 163 P.2d at 499.
43 50 Cal. 2d 812, 824, 330 P.2d 39, 45 (1958).
44 Id. at 825, 330 P.2d at 46.
45 Id., 330 P.2d at 47.
Id.Gerstein v. Pugh, U.S. 95 S.Ct.
854 (1975) was decided much later.
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the accused 7 This "refiling" power, held by
prosecutors everywhere, is a major handicap to
the accused, since he may have no incentive
to ask for exclusion at the preliminary hearing
when the prosecutor can have another complaint
filed. The accused will only have to wait a little
longer for his trial and, perhaps, spend that
time in jail. The California penal code also
provides that the granting of the motion to suppress at the original preliminary hearing has no
effect on the admission of evidence at grand
jury proceedings or at proceedings on a new
complaint. 48 If the magistrate or judge at the
preliminary hearing grants the motion to suppress, but finds enough other evidence to justify holding the accused, the State may request
a special hearing de novo in -the superior court
on the admissibility of the evidence suppressed
at the preliminary hearing. The State may
even appeal the decision of the court at the
special hearing to the trial court on the basis
of new evidence of the search and seizure's
validity.49 The accused, on the other hand, may
renew his motion to suppress at a special hearing if it is denied at the preliminary hearing.
But if the motion is denied at the special hearing also, the accused ordinarily can relitigate
the issue only by extraordinary writs of mandate or prohibition. 0
51
In Eiseman v. Superior Court, a motion to
suppress was granted at the preliminary hearing, but the state failed to request a special
hearing before the Superior Court within the
time permitted, by the penal code. The court
held in Eisenman that, in view of the state's
failure to follow the statutory procedure for relitigation, the finding of the court at the preto suppress
liminary hearing on the motion
52
was binding on the trial court.
47 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(i) (West Supp.
1975).
48 For California law regarding the admissibility
of evidence at the grand jury see note 7 supra.
49 CAr.. PENAL. CODE § 1538.5(f) (West 1954).
"0CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1538.5(h), 1538.5(i)
(West 1954). There is no right to suppress evidence once the trial has begun unless opportunity
for the motion did not exist prior to trial or the
defendant was not aware of the grounds for the
motion.
5121 Cal. App. 3d 342, 98 Cal. Rptr. 342
(1971).
a2 Id. at 348, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 345. For an early
evaluation of exclusion in California under the
statutory provision see Graham & Letwin, The

[Vol. 66

In Illinois, the decision to allow exclusion of
illegally seized evidence, apparently motivated
at least in part by constitutional considerations, 53 has been codified in the Illinois Code
of Criminal Procedure. The proper means of
exclusion in Illinois is the tendering of a motion to suppress at the preliminary hearing,
held occasionally before the trial judge, but
most often before a magistrate who does not
54
have jurisdiction to try the case.
Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles: Sone Field
Findings and Legal-policy Observations, 18
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 916, 947 (1971).
53 See Committee Comments (1963) to § 114-12
of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure, which
reads: "In accordance with Mapp v. Ohio, this
section denies the admission of illegally seized
evidence." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-12
(1973) (Comment).
54ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-3(e) (1973)
provides:
During preliminary hearing or examination
the defendant may move for an order of suppression of evidence pursuant to Section
114-11 or 114-12 of this Act or for other
reasons, and may move for dismissal of the
charge pursuant to Section 114-1 of this Act
or for other reasons. If any such order of
suppression of evidence or dismissal of the
charge is allowed and issued in the course of
any preliminary hearing or examination, such
order of suppression or of dismissal shall be
non-final, the State may not appeal therefrom,
and such order of suppression shall not in any
manner bar, affect or be determinative in any
subsequent proceedings.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-12 (1973) provides
in pertinent part:
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY
sEIzED (a) A defendant aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the court
for the return of property and to suppress as
evidence anything so obtained on the ground
that:
(1) The search and seizure without a warrant was illegal or
(2) The search and seizure with a warrant
was illegal because the warrant is insufficient
on its face; the evidence seized is not that described in the warrant; there was not probable cause for the issuance of the warrant; or,
the warrant was illegally executed.
(b) except that, if the order suppressing evidence is non-final according to See. 109-3 of
this Act, the property shall not be restored
and shall not because of such order be inadmissible at any proceeding other than such
preliminary hearing or examination.
It would appear that the specific provision for
motions to suppress at a preliminary hearing in
ILL. REV. Stat. ch. 38, § 109-3(e) (1973) is an
exception to the general statutory rule, provided in
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-12(d) (1973), that
the motion to suppress shall be made only before a
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As in Hawaii and California, the problem
arose in Illinois whether the ruling of the
court at the preliminary hearing ought to be
binding in later proceedings. The state supreme court and legislature of Illinois disagreed on the proper means to decide this question. In enacting the statutory provisions
allowing exclusion at preliminary hearings, the
Illinois legislature reversed state supreme court
decisions providing for appeal from the granting
of pretrial motions, and making corresponding
pretrial orders binding on the trial court in the
56
55
absence of an appeal. In People v. Taylor,
however, the Illinois supreme court noted that
it had passed a rule providing for appeals from
57
orders suppressing evidence. Finding that the
legislature's provisions had violated a state
constitutional provision conferring rule-making
58
powers on the supreme court, the court held
that to the extent that the statute provided that
the state could not appeal from a preliminary
hearing suppression order, such an order was
non-final and void. Nothing in Illinois law appears to prevent or provide for an appeal by
the accused from a denial of a motion to suppress at the preliminary hearing, however.
court with jurisdiction to try the offense. Were
this not the case, since magistrates have very
limited trial jurisdiction in criminal cases, the
right to suppress at preliminary hearings granted
by Illinois law would be ineffective. See ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 109-1 (1970) (Comment).
55Symposium-Illinois Supreme Court Revieu,
66 Nw. U.L. REV. 874, 876 (1972). The supreme
court cases reversed were People v. Quintera, 36
Ill. 2d 369, 223 N.E.2d 161 (1967) (motion for
discharge, rather than exclusionary motion, made
at preliminary hearing) and People ex rel. MacMillian v. Napoli, 35 Ill. 2d 80, 219 N.E.2d 489
(1966) (motion to suppress filed prior to indictment
but apparently not at the preliminary hearing).
The reversing legislation was Ir.L. REv. STAT. ch.
38, §§ 109-3(e), 114-12(b), supra note 54, which
provided that a decision of a court at a preliminary hearing in favor of exclusion would not be
appealable by the state and would not bind courts
at subsequent proceedings.
&5 50 Ill. 2d 136, 277 N.E.2d 878 (1972).
57 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110-A, § 604 (1973).
68 The Taylor court referred to section 7 of article VI of the 1870 constitution of Illinois as
amended. 50 Ill. 2d at 139, 277 N.E2d at 880. The
particular provision referred to, that the "Supreme
Court may provide by rule for appeals to the Appellate Court from other than final judgments of
the Circuit Courts," can now be found in ILL.
CoNsT. art. 6, § 6. Other provisions relating to
the supreme court's rule-making power may be
found at §§ 4, 5, 16.

In contrast to Hawaii, California and Illinois, other states' courts and legislatures have
forthrightly announced that however evidence
might have been obtained, it is generally admissible at preliminary hearings.8 9 Kansas, Arizona, and Wisconsin are states whose courts
and legislatures have engaged in particularly
interesting discussions of why they have
adopted such a rule.
In Kansas, the leading case is McIntyre v.
Sands. ° In that case the court explained that in
Kansas the main purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether the corpus
delicti has been established and to give the accused general information of the nature of the
crime charged and apprise him of the sort of
evidence he will be required to meet when he
is prosecuted in district court. The court held,
therefore, that the same formality or strict
compliance with procedure and the rules of evidence as would be present in a trial is not
necessary at a preliminary examination.
[W]here an attempt has been made to give
an accused a preliminary examination and he
has been given reasonable notice by the papers
and proceedings in the case, of the nature and
character of the offense charged, the examination has served its principal purpose, and is
ordinarily regarded as sufficient.61
In Arizona, Rule 5.3(b) of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 62 making inapplicable to
preliminary hearings "rules or objections calling for the exclusion of evidence on the
ground that it was unlawfully obtained," was
promulgated by the state supreme court in
order to reverse the court's earlier ruling in
State v. Jacobson.63 The Jacobson case bears a
59 This is the general common law rule, said to
apply unless modified by constitutional or statutory requirements. 8 J. WIMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2183
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
60 128 Kan. 521, 278 P. 761 (1929).
61 Id. at 522-23, 278 P. at 762. For a somewhat
critical review of Kansas law see Comment, Preliminary Examination-Evdence and Due Process,
15 KAN. L. Rav. 374, 383-86 (1967).
62ARiz. R. Cram. P.5.3(b).
(1970). See
63 106 Ariz. 129, 471 P.2d 1021
ARiz. R. Cmm. P.5.3(b) (1956) (Comment), which
states in part:
Rule 5.3(b) thus limits such issues as suppression motions or objections to the "competency" of the evidence-to decision by the trial
court. This section reverses the ruling in State
v. Jacobson... and adopts instead the federal
standard. Giordenello v. United States . ...
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striking resemblance to the Wilson case in
Hawaii 6" on its facts and in the opinion of the
court. The defendant was charged with the unlawful possession of marijuana. Before his preliminary hearing, he moved to suppress the
seized marijuana on the grounds that it was
obtained in violation of the fourteenth amendment. The state objected to the court's jurisdiction to hear and determine the motion and
obtained a writ of prohibition against the justice who sat at the preliminary hearing. The
state then sought a writ of special action from
the state supreme court. At issue was whether
the lower court properly found that it had the
jurisdiction to entertain the motion to suppress
and any other constitutional claims that might
65

be raised.

In denying the writ of special action in Jacobson, the state supreme court stated that the
lower court did not have the power to grant a
motion to suppress evidence because the superior court had exclusive jurisdiction of felony
cases under the Arizona constitution. However,
the supreme court ruled that the lower court
did have jurisdiction to rule at the preliminary
hearing on an objection to the admission of
evidence that the search and seizure was unlawful and the evidence incompetent.66
Early Wisconsin decisions indicated that ex67
clusion might be approved in that state.
18 U.S.C., FEDERAL RULES
DuPE 5.1(a) (Supp. 1973).

OF CRIMINAL PROCE-

See also La Sota, Preliminary Proceedings Under
the New Rules of Criminal Procedure, 9 ARIz.
(1973). And note that rule 2.4 of
BAR J. 11

Arizona's Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a
finding of probable cause at the preliminary hearing based on "any testimony before ...

the magis-

trate or . any affidavits submitted" (emphasis
P.2.4. Thus, Arizona
added). ARiz. R. Ciru.
is one state that allows a probable cause finding to
be based wholly or in part on evidence seized in
an improper manner.
"4See text accompanying notes 12-23 supra.
65 106 Ariz. at 130, 471 P.2d at 1022.
66 Id.
67 Brisk

v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 584, 172 N.W.2d
199 (1969) (court relates without comment a dispute at the preliminary hearing concerning the
voluntariness of a confession, but notes that the
failure of the magistrate to exclude it did not affect the defendant's right to contest its admissibility at trial) ; State ex rel. Wojtycsld v. Hanley,
248 Wis. 108, 20 N.W.2d 719 (1945) (challenged
evidence had not been illegally seized); Hancock
v. Hallman, 229 Wis. 127, 281 N.W. 703
(1938) (magistrate exceeds jurisdiction if he lacks
competent evidence) ; State v. Baltes, 183 Wis. 545,
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These decisions prompted the state legislature
to pass a law in 1969 stating that in felony actions, which are the only ones in which the accused is entitled to a preliminary hearing in
Wisconsin, motions to suppress can not be
made at a preliminary hearing. 8 The legislative history of the statute indicates that the
reason for its enactment was to promote administrative efficiency by preventing the same
motion from being made both at the preliminary hearing and prior to trial.6 9 There have
been no Wisconsin cases indicating that any
right to exclude evidence by objection or motion to strike at the preliminary hearing survived the legislature's limitation on the motion
to suppress.
While the above mentioned states represent
the extremes with regard to allowing exclusion
at the preliminary hearing-Hawaii, California, and Illinois clearly allowing it and Kansas, Arizona, and Wisconsin just as clearly
disallowing it-the positions of other states
cannot be so easily characterized. Of this latter
group, New York, Michigan, Nevada, and
Idaho are examples of states showing some indications of allowing exclusion.
In New York, the state code of criminal procedure is generally silent as to whether evidence
other than hearsay that would be inadmissible
at trial is admissible at a preliminary
hearing.70 The only relevant provision requires
that motions to suppress in cases involving an
undetermined felony complaint must be made,
not before the magistrate, but before the superior court having jurisdiction to try the
71

offense.

Two cases provide the bulk of perti-

nent judicial discussion of the exclusion problem.
198 N.W. 282 (1924) (evidence secured by a warrant, shown to have been issued without sworn
testimony to support it, will be suppressed).
o8Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 970.02(c), 971.31(5) (b)
(1971).
,69 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.31(5) (b) (1971) (Comment). Recall that the dissenting judge in Wilson
put forward the same argument and that administrative efficiency was one of the reasons for the
passage of the federal statute prohibiting exclusion
at the preliminary hearing.
70 R. PITLER, NEm
YORK CRIMINAL PRACTICE
UNDER THE CPL 208 (1972). Admission of hearsay evidence is prohibited at the preliminary hearing under CPL § 180.60 (McKinney 1971).
,' N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 710.50(1) (b) (McKinney 1971).
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In People v. Weiss,7 2 a magistrate, finding
no probable cause to bind over for trial, noted
that under New York law probable cause had
to be based upon the legal evidence before him.
He stated that he could not act upon a suspicion founded on statements of the deceased,
unless they were properly in evidence as dying
declarations. 73 From this holding, it appears
that New York applies the same general rules
of evidence at the preliminary hearing as at
trial.

In People ex rel. Ruppert v. Hoy,74 the
Supreme Court of Westchester County held
that the petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding was not entitled at his preliminary hearing
to a statutory suppression hearing to determine
the voluntariness of a confession which the
state was attempting to use against him. The
court noted, however, that a magistrate could
not hold the defendant for the grand jury,
which is the result of a probable cause finding
in New York, where the evidence before him
showed the inculpatory statement on which
probable cause had to be based was
involuntary.7 5 Presumably, the court meant by
this that the probable cause finding would not
stand when attacked in a higher court and that
the complaint in such cases should be dismissed. Objections to evidence at preliminary
hearings other than motions to suppress, however, are not ruled out by Ruppert. Nor does
Ruppert or New York statutory law prohibit
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence at the
7 6
preliminary hearings granted misdemeanants.
In Michigan, the state supreme court has
held that the corpus delicti in a criminal case
72 147 Misc. 595, 261 N.Y.S. 646 (Mag. Ct.
1932).
73 147 Misc. at 597, 261 N.Y.S. at 648. Weiss
involved a prosecution for a homicide resulting
from a criminal abortion. The only evidence that
would establish the crime and inculpate the defendants consisted of a written statement signed by
the deceased woman and the testimony of a coroner as to statements made to him by the deceased
prior to her death. Found: no probable cause
because hearsay statements were not admissible as
dying declaration.
74 50 Misc. 2d 326, 270 N.Y.S.2d 647, aff'd 25
App. Div. 2d 884, 270 N.Y.S.2d 975 (1966).
75 50 Misc. 2d at 329, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
76 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 170.75 (McKinney
1971) provides that preliminary hearings shall be
held before the magistrate, in what is also the trial
court, only in the case of misdemeanors charged
within New York City.

must be established at the preliminary hearing
by competent evidence and that the rights of
criminal defendants are fully safeguarded by
objections of their counsel to the admission of
incompetent evidence.7 7 However, the manner
in which a preliminary hearing is conducted in
Michigan is historically very largely within the
sound discretion of the magistrate.78 Apparently, the rationale for the Michigan rule is
that the object of the preliminary hearing inquiry would be defeated if the magistrate did
not have the discretion to search into whatever
evidence seems relevant to the finding of probable cause.79 The only significant Michigan decision that places limitations on the discretion
of the magistrate to determine whether evidence is or is not competent at the preliminary
hearing is People v. Hatt. 0 In that case, the
Supreme Court of Michigan laid down the rule
that no evidence of prior convictions is properly admissible at a preliminary hearing.
In Nevada, Goldsmith v. Sheriffs ' is the
only case providing some basis for exclusion.
Quoting People v. Schuber,8 2 the court in that
case stated that evidence received at a preliminary hearing must be legal evidence. The case
was a challenge to a bind-over decision based
on hearsay, rather than evidence obtained by
unreasonable search and seizure. Moreover, the
court found that the hearsay which had been
accepted by the court at the preliminary hearing was admissible under a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Thus, the court's
statement that only legal evidence can be received at the preliminary hearing is dicta.
Finally, in Idaho, the state supreme court
held in Martinez v. State83 that a statement
made by the defendant to a sheriff that he
kicked the deceased child was an "admission,
not a confession" and was admissible at the
preliminary hearing without any proof that it
77 People v. Asta, 337 Mich. 590, 60 N.W.2d
472 (1953).
75People v. Maire, 42 Mich. App. 32, 201
N.W.2d 318 (1972).
79 G.

GILLEsPIE, MICHIGAN

CRI

I AL LAW AND

PRAcrIcE § 303 (1953). Gillespie finds the rule in
effect as early as 1876 and states that all facts and
incidents which "plainly relate to the offense" are
admissible at the preliminary hearing.
8o 384 Mich. 302, 181 N.W.2d 912 (1970).
8' 85 Nev. 295, 454 P.2d 86 (1969).
82 71 Cal. App. 2d 773, 163 P.2d 498 (1945).
8s 90 Idaho 229, 409 P.2d 426 (1965).
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had been voluntarily made. This holding implies that proof of the voluntariness of a confession must be shown at a preliminary hearing in Idaho, but it does not deal directly with
unconstitutionally seized evidence. No other
Idaho case casts any light on the admissibility
of unconstitutionally obtained evidence at a
preliminary hearing.
DISCUSSION

[Vol. 66

exclusionary rule in preliminary hearings must
be reconciled with the Supreme Court's failure
to recognize any constitutional necessity for
exclusion at the preliminary hearing.8 6 Perhaps
one reason for the Supreme Court's failure to
require exclusion at the preliminary hearing is
the Court's recognition of only a limited con7
stitutional right to a preliminary hearing. If
states are free under the Constitution to eliminate the preliminary hearing altogether, then it
is arguable that the accused person has no con.
stitutional right to have his preliminary hearing conducted in any particular way. If this is
the rationale for the Supreme Court's stand,
however, it should be reexamined. The same
rationale would support allowing the preliminary hearing to be conducted along the lines of
a trial by ordeal, to give just one example of
the clearly unacceptable alternatives states
might adopt.
Whatever the reasons for the Supreme
Court's stand, it is not dispositive of the controversy over exclusion that has arisen in the
states. The Court's rulings do not prevent other
courts and legislatures from requiring exclusion at preliminary hearings on federal constitutional grounds. Indeed, so long as no
rights recognized by the Supreme Court are
denied by the states, other courts and legislative bodies should feel free to extend whatever
rights they wish to accused persons. In doing
so, the state courts and legislatures serve as
laboratories of reform and provoke further examination by the Court of its past decisions.
Furthermore, state courts and legislatures
can allow exclusion at preliminary hearings on
other than federal constitutional grounds. The
seldom cited ninth amendment to the Constitution could stand for the proposition that federally guaranteed constitutional rights need not
be the only ones an accused person possesses.
It states:

Having surveyed the arguments put forward
by judges and legislators in various jurisdictions as they have considered whether evidence
obtained by unreasonable searches and seizures
should be excluded at preliminary hearings, this
comment evaluates the usefulness of such exclusion in light of the policy considerations
latent in the arguments for and against exclusion.
At least two strong constitutional arguments
can be presented for exclusion at the preliminary hearing. First, deterrence of unconstitutional police misconduct has always been one
of the main purposes of the exclusionary rule.
Contrary to the opinion of the dissent in State
v. Wilson,84 exclusion at the preliminary hearing can have a deterrent effect. Where evidence seized unconstitutionally is admissible at
preliminary hearings, police could seize evidence illegally, hoping to use it to bind the
accused over for trial. While he is incarcerated
or out on bail, the police could unearth additional evidence, untainted by illegal police activities, which could support a conviction.
Where illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible at the preliminary hearing, however,
police could not profit by unlawfully obtaining
evidence and might be deterred from such activity. It has been argued that the exclusionary
rule has no deterrent effect at trial because a
trial is too remote from police behavior. If this
is true, the police are more likely to be deterred at an early stage of the criminal process. If, however, considerations such as avoidThe enumeration in the Constitution, of cering the taint of judicial partnership in official
tain rights shall not be construed to deny or
lawlessness and the subsequent undermining of
disparage others retained by the people.
popular trust in courts are primary, then
tainted evidence must be excluded at all crimiPreliminary Examination--Evidence and Due
nal proceedings.8 5
Process,
15 KAN. L. Rxv. 374, 383-86 (1967).
8
6 This problem was mentioned by the dissenting
These rationales for the application of the
justice in Wilson. See text accompanying notes
8
24-26 supra. The dissenting justice in Priestly also
8 4 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
5 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, mentioned it. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
87 See note 11 supra.
355 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Comment,
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In addition, differences in state court procedure
from that in the federal system might support
exclusion. For example, state law might require
preliminary hearingsss or give a magistrate the
authority to make suppression orders.
One of the principal arguments against allowing exclusion mentioned several times in
the cases and the comments to the statutes examined earlier 9 is that of administrative
efficiency. Resolving constitutional issues at the
preliminary hearing stage increases the amount
of time required for the preliminary hearing
and may be one of the main reasons for increasing calendar congestion in municipal
courts.90 The argument for maximizing administrative efficiency is most cogent if a court's
decision on a motion to suppress at a preliminary hearing is not final. If a motion to suppress or strike can be heard once at the preliminary hearing, again at trial, and perhaps
even a third time at a grand jury proceeding,
this is an inefficient procedure indeed. However, the determination at the preliminary
hearing might be made final as long as appeal
is allowed in order to avoid gross unfairness.
Of course, advocates of maximization of administrative efficiency could still argue that the
possibility of appeals to state appellate courts
by prosecutors and defendants would nevertheless prolong final judgment and further crowd
appellate dockets. The administrative efficiency
argument is a double-edged sword, however.
Where exclusion motions cannot be heard and
determined at the preliminary hearing, expenses
on the part of the State and the accused may
often be increased because prosecutors take
cases to trial in the mistaken belief that the evidence they intend to use will survive the pretrial motion to suppress. Even if only a portion
of the state's evidence in a particular case has
been obtained illegally, the prosecutor may be
obliged to drop the case after much needless
88 California is one state that has a statutory
provision requiring preliminary hearings. See note
39 supra.
so See the dissenting opinion in Wilson in the
text accompanying note 31 supra; the comment to
the Wisconsin statute prohibiting motions to suppress at the preliminary hearing, supra note 69;
FED. R. CR, . P. 5.1 (Advisory Committee Notes).
90 Graham & Letvin, The Preliminary Hearing
in Los Angeles-Some Field Findings and LegalPolicy Observations, 18 U.C.L.A.L. Rzv. 916, 944
(1971).

expense if there is no exclusion motion permitted at the preliminary hearing. An early indication of possible success on the merits and the
admissibility of evidence might therefore increase the efficiency of the state's criminal
process.
A further argument occasionally made in the
cases and comments to the statutes examined
earlier 9 ' is that prosecutors may choose to
forego a preliminary hearing in jurisdictions
allowing motions to suppress, thereby denying
the accused the benefits he derives from that
proceeding. This argument neglects to note
that prosecutors often try to avoid preliminary
hearings whenever possible even in jurisdictions where motions for exclusion of evidence
cannot be made at the preliminary hearing.
This is done because the possibilities for discovery inherent in a preliminary hearing are
thought to be a great advantage for the
92
accused.
An argument against allowing exclusion at
the preliminary hearing that is related to the
avoidance of preliminary hearings by prosecutors is the contention that unless motions to
suppress can be made at the preliminary hearing, rather than just motions to strike or
objections to evidence, the prosecutor often
will be able to postpone the determination of
the constitutionality of certain evidence until
trial, even if exclusion is allowed. Unlike the
motion to suppress, the motion to strike or
objection to evidence cannot be used by the defense to exclude from use at trial evidence
which the prosecutor finds unnecessary to introduce at the preliminary hearing.9 3 The utility of the motion to suppress to prevent the future use of evidence is limited by the
requirement, generally imposed, that the party
moving for a suppression order show that he
has reason to believe that improper evidence
will in fact be offered eventually against the
defendant. Also, an order of suppression binds
only the opposing party and his counsel. It
does not prevent unsuspecting witnesses from
9

1See the Wilson dissent in the text accompanying notes 32-33 supra; FED. R. Cuim. P. 5.1
(Advisory Committee Notes).
02 See J. Moore, supra note 33, § 5.1.0211].
93 Graham & Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing
in Los Angeles-Some Field Findings and LegalPolicy Observations, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 916, 947
(1971).
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volunteering suppressed information at trial in
9 4
response to a perfectly innocuous question.
Nevertheless, the motion to suppress is the
most powerful exclusionary weapon an accused
person can wield at the preliminary hearing,
and it would appear that exclusion cannot be
reasonably effective unless the motion to suppress can be made at the preliminary hearing.
Another argument against allowing exclusion
at preliminary hearings is that the accused
might lose his sixth amendment right to a speedy
trial. However, the preliminary hearing might
be considered part of the trial, thus tolling the
time limitation within which a trial must be
brought. Suppression at the preliminary hearing might even be made final, absent appeal, at
all subsequent proceedings against the accused,
thus eliminating the problem of refiling. Moreover, an accused person concerned about his
sixth amendment right has the option of saving his motion to suppress for the trial court if
he believes that moving for exclusion at the
preliminary hearing will detrimentally delay
his trial.9 5
Another argument against allowing exclusion at the preliminary hearing is that there is
little motive for the defense to launch an allout attack on the admissibility of evidence at
the preliminary hearing unless exclusion is
made binding in future proceedings. As mentioned in the discussion of administrative
efficiency, however, the determination at the
preliminary hearing of a motion to suppress
can be made final.
A final argument against allowing exclusion
at the preliminary hearing is that neither side
may be prepared to fully litigate the issue at
that early stage in the proceedings. Actually,
however, in states where exclusion is allowed
at the preliminary hearing, that proceeding has
served as a most important forum for the adjudication of constitutional issues. It has been estimated that constitutional rights are vindicated
more often at the preliminary hearing than at
94Note, Pretrial Exclusionary Evidence Rulings, 1967 Wis. L. Rv. 738, 742-43.
95 Although California law, mentioned in the
text accompanying note 50 supra, provides that
the accused, like the state, may waive his right to
contest the ruling on suppression at the preliminary hearing by appeal, no state provides that the
accused has waived his right to make a suppression motion if he does not make it at the preliminary hearing.

any other point in the criminal process. 90 Experience indicates, then, that when accused
persons are allowed to press for exclusion at
the preliminary hearing, their attorneys will
prepare to litigate that issue in order to adequately represent them and will force the state
to follow suit.
Opposing all of these arguments against exclusion at the preliminary hearing is the obvious interest of the accused in having an early
determination of the admissibility of evidence
that might be offered against him at trial.
Even if an accused has no federally conferred
or state constitutional right to have such a determination made at a preliminary hearing,
courts and legislatures must recognize that this
interest remains significant. The consequences
to the individual of being bound over for trial
are profound indeed, even if the accused is
never convicted. Incarceration may result, together with the degradation and expense of a
criminal trial. Irreparable harm to the accused's reputation may cost the accused his job
and perhaps the affection of his family and
friends. This is an approximation of criminal
punishment that should not be handed down,
perhaps, on the basis of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This comment has surveyed how many
courts and legislative bodies in the United
States have treated the issue of whether evidence seized in violation of constitutional
rights should be excluded at preliminary hearings. In some states, the decision has been
made to allow exclusion on motion of the accused or proper objection, contrary to present
federal practice and the apparent practice in
many other states. Although the states' decision-making processes have not been highly
visible in this area, the varying solutions
adopted can be seen as the interaction of existing state and federal procedures with policy
arguments that have rarely been fully articulated. Neither the arguments for, nor the arguments against exclusion are overwhelmingly
convincing. Many of them rest on behavioralist
96 Graham and Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles-Some Field Findings and
Legal-Policy Observations, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
916, 944 (1971).
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speculations on the consequences of policy
choices. Although some empirical data might
be procured to support the strong arguments
against exclusion on the grounds of administrative inefficiency or encouragement of prosecutorial avoidance of preliminary hearings, the
value of such data is limited in the face of procedural variation among the states.
Reviewing the interests supporting and
opposing exclusion at the preliminary hearing

of evidence seized in violation of fourth and
fourteenth amendment rights, one is forced to
conclude -that neither exclusion nor admission
can or should be urged as a uniform national
standard. Perhaps the best approach at present
is for the "laboratories of the states" to develop those solutions to pretrial exclusion
problems that local experience finds most appropriate, since a uniform standard for the
states cannot yet confidently be proposed.
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THE EXCLUSION OF YOUNG ADULTS FROM JURIES:
A THREAT TO JURY IMPARTIALITY
As the number and complexity of criminal
prosecutions continue to grow, the constitutional guarantees extended to criminal defendants assume a significant role in the perpetuation of criminal justice. Yet, the ambiguous
expressions of such rights in the general terms
of the Constitution exist as a source of unlimited confusion. One such right, the sixth
amendment guarantee of a trial by an "impartial jury," 1 invokes a number of questions,
particularly regarding the nature of impartiality and the means necessary to achieve it. The
Supreme Court broadly construes the constitutional requirement to mean "a truly representative cross-section of the community." 2 However, the overwhelming amount of litigation
arising from this interpretation demonstrates
the need for a more suitable approach to jury
impartiality. Current pressures within the
American community have engendered constant redefinition of the cross-section without
creating a means for ascertaining the members
of the cross-section.3 One unresolved aspect of
the composition of the cross-section involves
the inclusion of eighteen to twenty-one year
olds in the jury process.
Until 1972 the minimum age qualification
1 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI states in pertinent
part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed.
Until 1968, the sixth amendment only applied to
federal criminal prosecutions. Then in Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) the Court stated:
Because we believe that trial by jury in
criminal cases is fundamental to the American
scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in
all criminal cases which-were they to be
tried in a federal court-would come within
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.
Id. at 149.
2 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
3 The most recent demonstration of this pattern
redefinition in accordance with popular pressure
relates to the inclusion of women within the jury
process. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522 (1975).

for jury service was almost universally twenty-one years or older, despite occasional attempts to lower the minimum age restrictions.
However, the ratification of the twenty-sixth
amendment, 4 which lowered the voting age to
eighteen for state and national elections, revitalized the interest in the inclusion of young
adults in the jury selection process. This interest produced an amendment to the Federal
Jury Selection and Service Act 5 which lowered
the age restriction to eighteen for federal criminal prosecutions. In turn, many states
amended their jury qualification provisions to
include eighteen to twenty-one year olds within
their jury pools. Nevertheless, nearly three
years after this trend began, a number of
states still reject the notion that their minimum age qualifications fail to include an important segment of the community in the jury
selection process. Even the states whose legislatures amended their juror qualification statutes to include eighteen to twenty-one year
olds exhibit a reluctance to include that group
within the actual jury panel. While inclusion
theoretically exists in these states, purposeful
exclusion may still occur through a lax implementation of the jury selection laws. If a jury
panel must resemble a representative cross-section of the community in order to achieve impartiality, any divergence from that composi4U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI states in pertinent
part:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United
States, who are eighteen years of age or
older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of age.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
,28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (Supp. II, 1972) provides:
In making such determination [of whether a
person is qualified for jury service] the chief
judge of the district court, or such other district court judge as the plan may provide,
shall deem any person qualified to serve on
grand or petit juries in the district unless he
(1) is not a citizen of the United States 18
years old...
28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (Supp. II, 1972), amending
28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (1970).
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tion poses a threat to the rights and interests
secured by the sixth amendment.
This comment will examine the current legislative and judicial attitudes toward the inclusion of young adults in the jury process and
will evaluate the impact of those attitudes on
the criminal defendant's right to an impartial
jury. Consideration of the meaning of representative cross-section, in light of its case-bycase construction, necessarily precedes these
points. A study of the development of the
cross-section requirement will demonstrate the
need to include young adults in order to
achieve jury impartiality.
DEFINING THE CROSS-SECTION
For over 150 years the courts regarded the
sixth amendment guarantee of an impartial
jury as the right to an unbiased jury.6 The realization that no jury selection process could
achieve that ideal standard resulted in the acceptance of a more practical definition of "impartiality." In 1940, the Supreme Court stated
in Sinith v. Texas:
It is part of the established tradition in the
use of juries as instruments of public justice
that the jury be a body truly representative of
the community. For . . . discrimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our
Constitution and the laws enacted under it but
is at war with our basic concepts of a demo-7
cratic society and a representative government.
Rather than seeking a jury panel untainted by
bias, the new approach attempted to blend the
community biases so as to cancel out their individual effects." Shortly thereafter the Court
in Glasser v. United States9 employed an ex6
See, e.g., Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, Baker v. Hunter, 317
U.S. 681 (1942); People v. Cravens, 375 Ill. 495,
31 N.E.2d 938 (1941) ; Foreman v. State, 203 Ind.
234, 180 N.E. 291 (1932).
7 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
8 See Comment, The Jury: A Reflection of the
Prejudices of the Community, 20 HASTINGS L.J.
1417 (1969). This article discusses the need for
change in jury selection in order to achieve a balance of prejudices existing within the community.
In addition, it suggests several possible remedies
including federal legislation pertaining to state
jury selection, proportional representation, statistical population analysis, and elimination of some
bases for exemptions and excusals.
0 315 U.S. 60 (1942).

pression which has since become the standard
against which courts evaluate the constitutionality of jury selection processes. Referring to a
federal jury statute, the Court deemed it reflective of a plan to make the jury "a crosstruly
and
community
section
of the
representative of it." 10
As the litigation following these early jury
selection cases indicates, much confusion existed concerning the "cross-section" requirement imposed by the Court. In cases then"1
and now,1 2 courts have explained that not
every jury must contain representatives of
every group in the community, for this would
require a jury of far more than twelve persons. The standard merely gives recognition to
"the fact that those eligible for jury service
are to be found in every stratum of society." 13
To achieve impartiality, the process of selection must function without the "systematic and
intentional exclusion" of any racial, economic
or social group, 14 for such exclusion would result in injury
not limited to the defendant; there is injury to
the jury system, to the law as an institution,
10 Id. at 86. The Court prefaced this phrase by
stating:
Our notions of what a proper jury is have developed in harmony with our basic concepts of
a democratic system and representative government.
Id. By imposing its view of the fundamental concerns of government on the case, the Court
apparently equated the need for impartiality of juries with the demand for representation in all
branches of American government.
"See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187
(1946); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S.
217 (1946).
12 See Taylor v Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)
in which the Court asserted that
in holding that petit juries must be drawn
from a source fairly representative of the
community we impose no requirement that
petit juries actually chosen must mirror the
community and reflect various distinctive
groups in the population.
Id. at 538.
13 Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217,
220 (1946). Cf. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261,
299-300 (1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting) where it
was stated:
[A] cross-section of the community includes
persons with varying degrees of training and
intelligence and with varying economic and
social positions. Under our Constitution, the
jury is ... a democratic institution, representative of all qualified classes of people.
34 Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217,
220 (1946).
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to the community at large and to the democratic ideals reflected in the processes of our
courts. 15
While these decisions clarified the initial
problems of interpretation of "a truly representative cross-section," they left unsolved the
matters of what constitutes "systematic exclusion" and where the burden of proof falls in
cases involving such flaws in the jury process.
One of the first Supreme Court cases to confront these issues, Fay v. New York, 6 involved the constitutionality of a "blue ribbon
jury panel." 17 The Court declared that
a mere showing that a class was not represented in a particular jury was not enough;
there must be a clear showing that its absence
was caused by discrimination; and in nearly
all cases, it has been shown to persist over
many years.18
Regarding proof of the existence of exclusionary practices, the Court held that the burden fell upon the petitioner.' 9 Here the petitioner failed to establish that the use of the
blue ribbon jury panel had resulted in discrimination. The Court thus rejected the notion
that the absence of any particular group from
the jury panel constituted a violation of the
fourteenth amendment, and deemed the New
York practice of selection of blue ribbon ju20
rors constitutional.
I Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195
(1946).
16 Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
17 Blue ribbon jury panels consist of jurors specifically selected from the general jury panel by
the county clerk. Each prospective blue ribbon
juror receives a subpoena to enter a personal appearance and testify under oath as to his qualifications and fitness. The standards prescribed for this
panel are far more restrictive than those applicable
to general jury panels and make ineligible those
who: (1) have been disqualified or exempted from
general service; (2) have been convicted of a
criminal offense or fraud in a civil court; (3)
possess an opinion regarding the death penalty
that would preclude their finding the defendant
guilty where the punishment was death; and (4)
doubt their ability to disregard prejudices, either
personal or created by publicity, in rendering an
opinion of the defendant's guilt. Blue ribbon juries
are part of the "regular trial machinery" in heavily populated jurisdictions of New York, and are
used in those cases where the court upon motion
of either party determines the need for the special
jury. Id. at 267-68.
18 Id. at 284.
19 Id.
20 The Court justified its decision in upholding
the "blue ribbon jury" practice as an act of judi-
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In 1954 the Supreme Court again considered
the question of what constitutes systematic exclusion in Hernandez v. Texas.2 ' The petitioner here, a man of Mexican descent, alleged
purposeful exclusion of persons of such origin
from jury service. 22 While most cases to that
time concerned exclusion on the 'basis of either
race 2 3 or sex, 24 the Court conceded that local

prejudices clearly extended to other groups defined as such by community norms. The Court
stated:
When the existence of such a distinct class is
demonstrated, and it is further shown that the
laws, as written or as applied, single out that
class for different treatment not based on
some reasonable classification, the guarantees
25
of the Constitution have been violated.
Thus, in Hernandez the court defined systematic exclusion as the arbitrary exclusion of a
distinct class of persons by a means unjustifia26
ble under the provisions of the Constitution.
cial self-restraint in the absence of federal legislation standardizing judicial administration in the
states. The majority suggested that interference by
the Court in state jury practices would result in
stagnation of the states' experimentation with new
techniques in jury selection. Id. at 295. However,
Justice Murphy rejected this reasoning, stating
that the Court should interfere when a state employs a practice which systematically excludes certain classes of persons deemed qualified for general
jury panels. Id. at 297 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
21347 U.S. 475 (1954).
22Petitioner established

that within Jackson
County, Texas, approximately 14 per cent of the
13,000 residents had Mexican or Latin American
surnames. The parties stipulated that "for the past
25 years there is no record of any person with a
Mexican or Latin American name having served
on a jury commission, grand jury or petit jury in
Jackson County." Id. at 480-81.
23 See, e.g.,
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1934).
24 See, e.g., Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S.
187 (1946) ; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942).
25 Hernandez
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478
(1954).
26 The Court in Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57
(1961), expanded this point by stating that where
an alleged systematic exclusion is accomplished
through a statutory exemption, the fundamental
questions to be considered are
whether the exemption itself is based on some
reasonable classification and whether the manner in which it is exercisable rests on some
rational foundation.
Id. at 61. These two cases give rise to the inference that any exclusion, whether by statutory
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Elaborating on the holding in Fay v. New
York, 27 the Court held that the petitioner had
the initial burden of proving that persons of
Mexican descent formed a "separate class"
within the community.28 It suggested that the
petitioner could establish that point by showing
the "attitudes of the community," 29 thereby
implicitly requiring a subjective factual analysis. The next step in the case depended upon
the petitioner's ability to demonstrate the discriminatory nature of the jury selection practice. To accomplish that task, the Court suggested a comparison of the percentage of
members of the alleged excluded class in the
community population with the percentage of
that class within -the actual jury pool.30 Where
the proportions proved to be unusually disparate and thus incompatible with the "representative cross-section" requirement, the burden
would presumably shift to the government to
prove the existence of a reasonable basis for
such practice. Nevertheless, the Court's proposals created problems in defining -the identity of
groups within the cross-section.
In Hernandez and later cases, the decisions
of the Court complicated rather than clarified
the issue.3 ' Moreover, the new decisions did
little more than reiterate the broad solutions
provided in the earlier cases. The vague standard for determining impartiality of a jury re-

means or actual selection practices, which operates
against an entire class must be shown to possess
some rational basis. Otherwise, the process will violate the constitutional guarantee of jury impartiality.
27 332 U.S. at 284.
28 See note 22 supra.
29 Hernandez
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478
(1954).
30 Id. While the Court in Heriandes offered statistical comparison as a logical means for examination of the representative nature of a jury selection process, it later rejected reliance on
proportional representation alone in achieving the
cross-section standard. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368
U.S. 57 (1961) in which the Court stated that
disproportion . . . on the list independently
carries no constitutional significance. In the
administration of the jury laws proportional
representation is not a constitutionally required factor.
Id. at 69. See also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202 (1965).
31 The decision in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968) further complicated matters because
the Court applied the sixth amendment to state
action.

mained unaltered from its 1942 form.3 2 As the
Court recently noted in Taylor v. Louisiana:
The unmistakable import of this Court's
opinions . . . is that the selection of a petit
jury from a 'representative cross-section of
the community' is an essential component of
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.3 s
Furthermore, the Court pointed out that Congress also adhered to this standard in the declaration of policy in the Federal Jury Selection
and Service Act. 34 Yet, despite the wide acceptance of the standard, application of the
cross-section requirement has proved far more
difficult than the simple expression indicates.
The major source of this difficulty inheres in
the resistance of the term to any precise definition, since every community has a distinct
composition. 5
In the absence of an exact definition, the
threat of spurious challenges to jury selection
processes compelled the Court to impose a policy that only "systematic and intentional exclusion" will be deemed unconstitutional.3 6 However, this expression has also defied restrictive
definition and has therefore resulted in considerable controversy.37 For instance, the right of
32 Glasser v. United States 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
3419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
3428 U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. II, 1972) states in
pertinent part:
It is the policy of the United States that
all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial
by jury shall have the right to grand and
petit juries selected at random from a fair
cross-section of the community in the district
or division wherein the court convenes.
32 See Comment, "Jury Mandering": Federal
Jury Selection and the Generation Gap, 59 IowA
L. REv. 401, 403 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Jury Mandering]. This article focused on the possibility of the existence of a constitutional right of
young adults to participate in federal juries.
38An early use of this phrase in connection
with jury selection appears in Thiel v. Southern
Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). The Court
recognized that complete representation of every
group in the community was an impossibility and
therefore an unreasonable interpretation of the
cross-section requirement. The Court preferred a
construction of the standard for impartial juries as
one by which prospective jurors would be selected
by court officials "without systematic and intentional
37 exclusion" of any identifiable groups.
See generally Comment, Twelve Good Persons and True: Healy v. Edwards, Taylor v. Louisiana, 8 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LiB. L. REv. 561
(1974)
[hereinafter cited as Twelve Good
Persoms]. This comment explores the constitutional significance of the exclusion of women from
juries.
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states to impose statutory qualifications for jurors has come under attack where qualifications such as a minimum age for jurors
allegedly result in unreasonable exclusion of
38
There is furtherotherwise qualified jurors.
more the problem of -sufficiency of proof where
the process allegedly constitutes systematic exclusion, in light of the Court's reliance upon a
two-factor test including both objective statisti3
cal and subjective factual analyses. 9
Finally, the "cross-section" requirement as it
relates to the "systematic exclusion" rule presents the problem of determining the existence
of an "identifiable group." 40 Prohibitions have
been imposed thus far upon discrimination
against groups identifiable on the basis of sex,
race, color, national origin, religion and eco41
However, the inclusion of race
nomic status.
and sex within this list during the past century
makes the exclusiveness of even the present
categories doubtful.
The guarantee of an impartial jury, representative of the community attitude, depends
upon recognition of the existence of all groups
competent to evaluate the defendant's rights.
This factor therefore constitutes the basis for
the inclusion of any class within the cross-section for jury service.
38 See Note, The Constitutionality of Excluding
Young People from Jury Service, 29 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 131 (1972)[hereinafter cited as Excluding Youong People]. The author here considers
the exclusion of young citizens from jury service
in light of the ratification of the twenty-sixth
amendment.
39 The Court prescribed the use of both objective statistical reports and subjective factual material in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625
(1972). Cf. note 030 supra.
40 Cf. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972)
in
which the Court stated that
the exclusion from jury service of a substantial and identifiable class of citizens has a potential impact that is too subtle and too pervasive to admit of confinement to particular
issues and particular cases.
ID. at 498. Despite this insight, the Court fails to
explain the nature of class identification.
41 The Federal Jury Selection and Service Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1862 (Supp. II, 1972), for example,
specifically prohibits the exclusion of persons from
jury service on those bases. The same list appeared
in Title II, § 201 of the Jury Selection and Service
bill drafted in 1967 to regulate state jury selection
processes. This part of the bill failed to pass. Committee on the Operation of the Jury System of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, Report
on the Federal and State Jury Selection and
Service Bill, 42 F.R.D. 353, 381-86 (1967).
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YOUNG ADULTS AS A COGNIZABLE GROUP
Determination of whether eighteen to twenty-one year olds should be considered an essential element of a fair and impartial jury
depends upon their existence as a cognizable
group within the community. Two factors support the contention that young adults do constitute a definite and essential part of the
social structure: an objective analysis of the
American population and consideration of
congressional legislation during the early
1970's. In contrast, judicial attitudes with few
exceptions represent the viewpoint that eighteen to twenty-one year olds do not exist as an
identifiable group within the American community. Consideration of the validity of each position resolves the dichotomy in favor of the acceptance of young adults as a necessary part of
the impartial jury.
First, an objective examination of the
American population reveals that it includes
twelve million citizens between the ages of
eighteen to twenty-one. 42 This figure represents 5.5 per cent of the total population. Approximately 79 per cent have graduated from
high school, and of this age group nearly half
43
of those graduates are enrolled in college.
Furthermore, many of the twelve million
young adults participate in the civilian or military labor force. They are subject to governmental taxes and to social security payments.
Since 1972 the eighteen to twenty-one year
olds have been eligible to vote in both state
and national elections under the twenty-sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution.
Finally and perhaps most significantly in considering their competency to serve as jurors,
the young adults of this country are subject to
the criminal laws of state and federal
governments. 44 Regarding the national community, then, eighteen to twenty-one year olds
42
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEPARTIMENT OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1973 at 32.

43 Committee on Federal Legislation, Statutory

Reduction of the Voting Age, 25

RECORD

OF

N.Y.C.B.A. 250 (1970) as submitted to Hearings
on Lowering the Voting Age to 18 Before the
Subcomnn. on Constitutional Amendments of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 622 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings 1970) ].
44See Excluding Young People, supra note 38,
at 131-32.
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constitute a definite part of social, political and
economic life.
Second, recent congressional legislation reinforces this objective analysis by accepting the
role of young adults in the community. In the
areas of voting rights and federal jury service,
Congress reacted to public pressure during the
early 1970's and lowered the minimum age requirements to eighteen. The Senate judiciary
subcommittee hearings on lowering the voting
age45 considered whether young adults in the
social structure have a discernible identity.
According to the report submitted by the National Committee on Causes and Prevention of
Violence,4" the youth of today are distinct from
any prior generation of youth in that they possess greater knowledge and perspective. The
report attributed these characteristics to the
availability of higher education for more young
adults and to the development of mass media and
scientific technology. The testimony of Senators
47
Birch Bayh of Indiana, Edward Kennedy of
48
Joseph Tydings of
and
Massachusetts,
Maryland -0 pointed to the parallel expansion of
the adult responsibilities of eighteen to twenty-one year olds. To illustrate this view, the
Senators cited military and civil service, responsibility under criminal and civil laws, and
tax accountability. Their testimony suggested
that depriving the same group of young adults
of the rights extended to persons over twentyone has created an anomalous situation for
eighteen to twenty-one year olds. Society's failure to accept their maturity in matters of political responsibility is incongruous with the recognition of their ability to defend their country
and of an adult responsibility for their actions
0
under the law. One commentary submitted to
the Senate subcommittee proposed that this
tension existing between the social and politi45 Hearings on Lowering the Voting Age to 18
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendinents of the Senate Coimm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong. 2d Sess. 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Seate Hearings (1968)]; Senate Hearings
(1970), supra note 43.
46 Senate Hearings (1970), supra note 43, at
315, 316.
-1 Senate Hearings (1968), supra note 45, at 3, 4.
48 Senate Hearings (1970), supra note 43, at 161.
49 Senate Hearings (1968), supra note 45, at 9.
50 Comment, Right to Vote at 18, 6 TRIAL 46,
47 (1970), included in Senate Hearings (1970),
supra note 43, at 427.

cal responsibilities of young adults could be relieved by extending the rights of inheritance,
voting, and jury service to eighteen to twenty-one year olds. In complying with that suggestion by lowering minimum age restrictions
for voting and federal jury service, Congress
implicitly accepted the existence of a qualified,
yet previously excluded, group of young citizens.
Notwithstanding these factors giving recognition to young adults as an identifiable group
within the community, courts with few exceptions have rejected the notion of such a group.
Jury impartiality which the Constitution requires demands that the selection processes include discernible groups of competent citizens.
As the Court stated in Peters v. Kiff:
When any large and identifiable segment of
the community is excluded from jury service,
the effect is to remove from the jury room
qualities of human nature and varieties of
human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the excluded group will
consistently vote as a class in order to conclude as we do, that its exclusion deprives the
jury of a perspective on human events that
may have unsuspected importance in any case
that may be presented. 51
Beyond the general statement, however, the
Supreme Court cases fail to enunciate any
standard for the establishment of group identity. Thus it remains the task of the lower
courts to establish their own criteria. Where
the problem arises with reference to young
adults, the courts have applied tests which are
unsuitable in light of the actual justification
for including eighteen to twenty-one year olds
in the jury panel.
The most restrictive approach yet taken is
52
that set forth in United States v. Guznan, a
employed
federal district court case, and later
in other federal and state cases. This test sets
up three factors upon which the determination
of the existence of a cognizable group will depend. First, the court must find that the
"group" has a definite composition which distinguishes its members. Second, this group
51407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972).
52 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd 468
F.2d 1245 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937
(1972).

COMMENTS
must be cohesive, possessing a basic similarity
of attitudes, ideas, and experience which ties
the members together and which would not be
adequately represented by a jury from which
53
this group were excluded. Finally, there must
would result in a
exclusion
that
be a possibility
bias against the interests of the group. Under
this test, the claim that eighteen to twenty-one
year olds constitute a cognizable group has
54
generally failed. In Guzman, for instance, the
court held that no factor other than age defined the group. Furthermore, since its membership was in a constant flux, the court
found it impossible to discern any definite
composition. As a consequence, the district
55
court found that no identifiable class existed.
Other courts, however, have rejected the position taken in Guzman. In United States v.
Butera,56 the First Circuit admitted the difficulty of defining a precise group. Furthermore,
it insisted that too much precision
would introduce unnecessary and unrealistic
inflexibility and might effectively preclude
anyone from ever showing a distinct class [in
terms of age].57
In Butera, the court implicitly rejected a test
5 At least this part of the Guznza test has
been adopted elsewhere. See, e.g., Adams v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 55, -, 524 P.2d 375, 379,
115 Cal. Rptr. 247, 250 (Sup.Ct. 1974) in which
the court held:
While exclusion of other groups [beyond racial, sexual, political, economic, social, religious and geographical groups] might also be
improper, it is apparent that, before exclusion
may be held improper, there must be a cormthread runming through the excluded
1mo
group-a basic similarity of attitudes, ideas or
experience among its members so that the exclusion prevents juries from reflecting a
cross-section of the community. (Emphasis
added).
Whether the court accepted the other facets of the
Guzman test is unclear from the opinion. See also
People v. Veralli, 64 Misc. 2d 321, 314 N.Y.S.2d
723 (1970).
,54 See United States v. Olson, 473 F.2d 686
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973);
United States v. Ross, 468 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973); cf.
Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d 141 (7th Cir.
1972). In the last of these cases, Chase, the court
observed that the enumeration of prohibited bases
of discrimination failed to include any reference to
age groups in 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1972). Id. at 146.
5 United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140,
145 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
56 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970).
57 Id. at 571.
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as stringent as that employed later in Guzman.
Instead of the three-fold test, this court concluded that common experience alone sufficed
to establish variations in attitudes based on age
differences and thus provided a basis upon
which the court could conclude that
young adults constitute a cognizable though
purposes
admittedly ill-defined group for the
58
of the defendant's prima facie case.
To deny such group's existence would be to ignore
the contemporary national preoccupation with
a 'generation gap' which creates the impression that the attitudes of young adults are in
59
some sense distinct from older adults.
Although this case arose during a time when
discussion of a generation gap was prominent
in national news, the bases for such a gap still
pervade American society. Young adults continue to occupy an unique economic, social and
philosophical position in society. Thus the
treatment in Butera of youth as an identifiable
group finds justification today just as it did in
1968. Moreover, the fact that the group recognized in Butera ranged in age from twenty-one
to twenty-nine does not lessen the significance
of the case.60 While clearly in the minority,
Butera represents a judicial awareness of the
distinctive characteristics of young adults.
Since the court decided Butera, other state and
federal courts who are unwilling to preclude
young adults from jury service solely on the
basis of a narrow definition of group identity,
have recognized the existence of a group of
58 Id. at 570.
59 Id. The court's view that young adults possess attitudes different from those of their elders
finds support in sociological studies of youth. See,
e.g., K. KENISTON, YOUNG RADICALS (1968);
K. kENISTO, THE UNCOMMITTED (1965).
60 The breadth between the upper and lower age
limits of the "young adult" group provided a basis
of distinction between this case and a later one. See
United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 145
(S.D.N.Y. 1970). Furthermore, the group in Butera failed to encompass eighteen to twenty year
olds. This factor arguably makes the application of
Butera to the group of eighteen to twenty-one
year olds even more tenuous. However, Butera
arose prior to the period when the campaign for
the rights of young adults gained momentum. One
may speculate that, had the court decided Butera
in the 1970's, the First Circuit would have included eighteen to twenty year olds in the category.
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young adults in order to reach the issue of discrimination. 6 '
As present case laws reflects, the reluctance of
most courts to admit the presence of a cognizable
class of eighteen to twenty-one year Olds within
the American community stems from an unsatisfactory, rigid definition of a group. 62 Yet the
approach taken in determining the existence of
a group of young adults is far more restrictive
than any test applied where other alleged
groups have been considered for jury service
purposes. For example, a series of cases culminating in Taylor v. Louisiana 3 gave recognition to the existence of women as a group for
jury purposes without demanding that the petitioner demonstrate cohesion within that group.
Rejecting the view that an all-male jury would
be as representative as one including women,
the Court in Taylor admitted that neither sex
acted as a class when participating in jury duties. However, the inclusion of both sexes is
essential due to the "subtle interplay of influence one on the other." 64 Itcan be argued
likewise that while young adults as jurors do
not necessarily act as a group, their presence
may have a definite influence on the jury de61 On the federal level see Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) in which the Court was
willing to assume that such a group existed in
order to reach the narrower issue of discrmination.
See also White v. Georgia, 414 U.S. 886 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
On the state level see State v. Holmstrom, 43
Wis. 2d 465, 168 N.W.2d 574 (1969) where the
court held:
We find no authority with reference to the
systematic exclusion of young persons as prohibited discrimination. Nevertheless, we think
systematic discrimination in regard to age
would render the jury array jirst as defective
as any other type of systematic discrinination.
Within these guidelines then, it is necessary to
review the proof this defendant introduced in
his challenge to this array.
Id. at 473, 168 N.W.2d at 578 (emphasis added).
Even where the courts as in Hohnstrom have
been willing to recognize or assume a cognizable
group of young adults, they have found no instances of systematic exclusion. Thus the restrictive interpretation of an identifiable group is not, in
itself, the determinative factor in the exclusion of
young adults from juries.
62 See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
63419 U.S. 522 (1975). Earlier cases concerning the inclusion of women on juries are: Hoyt v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 51 (1961); Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
04Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).

termination. Like all jurors, they react to cases
on the basis of values engendered by their personal experiences; yet, by virtue of the technological, educational and other forms of
modernization within the past twenty-five
years, experiences brought into the court by
young jurors may differ greatly from those of
older jurors. Thus, in light of the "subtle interplay" of different human attitudes, the exclusion of this segment of the community results in a jury improperly excluding a distinct
element of the community.
ExCLUSION FROM THE CROSS-SECTION

Assuming that a cognizable group of young
adults does exist with the American community,
the next issue is whether such group has been
wrongfully excluded from the "representative
cross-section of the community," the jury panel.
Claims of exclusion of eighteen to twenty-one
years olds have arisen in two distinct situations. First, the absence of young adults from
the jury selection process may stem from the
statutory imposition of minimum age qualifications. Second, the alleged exclusion may result
from a latent discriminatory application of jury
selection procedures. Although the end products of both processes are identical, the analysis
of their development and possible effects and
remedies requires separate treatment.
Until 1972 nearly all complaints of wrongful
exclusion of eighteen to twenty-one year olds
fell in the first category. 65 Eligibility for jury
service in federal and most state courts in part
depends upon minimum age qualifications.
Prior to 1968, the federal jury qualification depended upon the laws of the state in which the
federal court sat. The Federal Jury Selection
and Service Act of 1968 required jurors to be
at least twenty-one for federal juries. 66 The
states, allowed to establish their own juror
qualifications, generally conformed to the federal minimum age restriction. In August 1970,
the National Conference of Commissioners of
'5 United States v. Tantash, 409 F.2d 227 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 968 (1969) ; George v.
United States, 196 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 843 (1952); United States v. Guzman,
337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (trial jury
selected prior to enactment of the amendment to
the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1865 (1972)).
6628 U.S.C. § 1865 (Supp. II, 1972).
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Uniform State Laws approved a Uniform Jury
Selection

and Service Act

67

resembling the

federal legislation and submitted it to the states
for their consideration. This act also set the
6
proposed age qualification at twenty-one. "
twentyof
acceptance
This nearly universal
one as the minimum age for qualified jurors
was founded upon two factors. To begin with,
the age of twenty-one had long represented the
6
age of maturity in Anglo-American society
and thus became the age at which citizens
70
were competent to serve as jurors. In George
v. United States, the Ninth Circuit stated:
[M]inority as a disqualification for participation in certain types of employment and the
performance of certain public or social functions is recognized in the law of U.S.1
Rejecting the argument that the statute wrongfully excluded minors from jury service, the
court held that
as to adults, minors would represent not a
part of the cross-section of the community, but
adult
a wholly foreign group unrelated to the
72
stream which dominates American life.

67 See Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act,
8 HARv. J. LEis. 280 (1971). The Commissioners

suggested that while the states have a right to
prescribe restrictions upon juror eligibility, they
are bound to observe the uniform standard imposed by the fourteenth amendment due process
clause. The Conference offered this model act as a
means of achieving consistency in the states' interpretations of due process as it relates to state jury
selection. However, only a handful of states, including Maryland, Maine, Michigan and North
Carolina, have enacted the model provision.
68 Id. at 300.

69 See James, The Age of Majority, 4 AM. J.
in which the author traces
LEGAL HisT. 22 (1960)
the history of the designation of twenty-one as the
age of majority. He concludes that age was adopted
as such during the mid-thirteenth century when the
age for knighthood was raised from fifteen to
twenty-one. Mr. James attributed this change in
the minimum age for knighthood, not to any recognition of increased maturity or competency, but to
the increased weight of armor and need for extra
training in combat skills and chivalry. This age
was then carried over into the common law.
U.S. Attorney General Richard
70 Deputy
Kleindienst observed during his testimony before
the Senate subcommittee hearing that in England,
where twenty-one was first recognized as the age
of maturity, Parliament lowered "the age of full
legal capacity" to eighteen, effective January 1,
1970. Moreover, this act also set the minimum age
for jury service in England. Senate Hearing (1970),
supra note 43, at 78.
71 George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445, 452
(9th Cir. 1952).
72 Id. at 454. This case arose out of an alleged
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The Ninth Circuit decided this case in 1952;
courts in more recent cases have dealt with the
minimum age requirement of twenty-one
merely as a matter of legislative discretion.
This change in position perhaps stems from
the parallel change in attitudes towards twenty-one as the age of maturity. Eighteen to
twenty-one year olds no longer represent a
"wholly foreign" entity, but have come to be
viewed as a part of adult society with attendant responsibilities and obligations.
In addition, the present view arises from the
judicial acceptance of the legislatures' right to
impose certain criteria for jury selection purposes. With regard to state jury selection, for
example, the Supreme Court held in Carter v.
Jury Commissioner:
The states remain free to confine the [jury]
selection to citizens, to persons meeting specified qualifications of age and educational attainment and to those possessing good intelli7
gence, sound judgment and fair character. 3
On the federal level, the Fifth Circuit asserted
in United States v. McVern that
it has never been thought that federal juries
must be drawn from a cross-section of the
total population without the imposition of any
74
qualification.
The courts repeatedly upheld the statutory disqualification of eighteen to twenty-one year
olds as within the legislative prerogative.
violation of the Selective Service Act of 1948, 50
U.S.C.A. appendix §§ 453, 456(j), 462 (1948), by
a person under twenty-one years old.
73 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970). This case is the
first affirmative relief case in the area of jury
selection. The petitioner was not a criminal defendant seeking to challenge the composition of the
jury which convicted him. Instead the case was
brought as a class action by Negroes in the
Greene County vicinity who charged local jury officials with discriminatory exclusion. Justice Jackson suggested such an action as a means of attacking state jury selection in Cassell v. Texas, 339
U.S. 282, 298 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
74 436 F.2d 1120, 1122 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 822 (1971). This case was an appeal
from a conviction of unlawful possession and sale
of a hallucinogenic drug STP. The petitioner was
under twenty-one years of age, whereas the jury
which convicted him was drawn from a pool excluding persons under twenty-one. The Fifth Circuit held that the statutory exclusion of persons
under twenty-one years old did not deprive petitioner of his rights under the fifth and sixth
amendments.
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A second ground for excluding that age
group from jury service lay in the parallel disqualification of eighteen to twenty-one year
olds for other purposes such as voting in national and state elections. However, the minimum age qualification for voting historically
derived from the concept that twenty-one was
the age of majority. As the ratification of the
twenty-sixth amendment indicates, there was
no longer any viable foundation for the twentyone year old age of majority by 1972. The
Senate hearings which considered proposals
for that amendment illustrate this point. Senator Bayh, for instance, suggested that it would
be
in keeping with the tradition of expansion of
the franchise, as well as recognition of the
greater role played by American youth in our
lives today, that we should now allow the
Constitution to reflect what has already become a fact of life in our land: that our
young people today are well-bred, well-educated and extremely well aware of the position and needs of our Nation, and that they
should now be permitted to participate in the
building of our Nation through the most valuable American right, the right to vote.75
Similarly, Senator Tydings stated that any regard for the age of twenty-one as the traditional age of maturity should not remain
"sacred or immutable."
Whatever justification existed for imposing 21
as the minimum age a century ago, however,
the fact is that today's American young people
are achieving physical, emotional, and mental
maturity at an earlier age than ever before.
While the traditional 21 year old voting age
has remained unchanged, the character of our
population has changed drastically, especially
with regard to the education, maturity and responsibilities assumed by our young people.7 6
In 1972 Congress and the ratifying states finally
recognized as anachronistic the practice of
restricting voting rights to citizens at least
twenty-one years old. They thus lowered the
minimum age to eighteen for state and national
7
elections. 7
Loss of the voting age justification for the
minimum age requirement for jury service re77 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. See note 4 supra.
7o Id. at 9.
77 U.S. CoNsT. amend XXVI. See note 4 supra.

suited in immediate attacks upon the jury
selection processes of state and federal jurisdictions. In Guzman, the petitioners alleged that
the right to serve on juries was analogous to
the right to vote, and that, as fundamental
rights, neither could be denied without a
compelling governmental interest.78 Therefore,
statutory exclusion of eighteen to twenty-one
year olds under the Federal Jury Selection and
Service Act violated the Constitution.
The court disagreed, finding no justification
for equating the two. 9 The court argued that
while voting enables the voter to express his
personal beliefs and interests, jury service necessitates the juror's acceptance and application of the law as the judge instructs. The
court then stated that the latter act demands a
greater maturity and understanding than voting. Furthermore, while voting is a fundamental right, the court held that sitting in judgment of another is not a right, but a duty
imposed on those selected. However, the right
more properly at issue in jury selection cases
is the right of the defendant to an impartial
jury, in which case the statutory exclusion of
young adults does jeopardize a fundamental
right of the criminal defendant. Congress presumably considered this factor in 1972 when it
amended the Federal Jury Selection and Service Act to include eighteen to twenty-one year
olds within the federal jury process.8 0
On the state level the twenty-sixth amendment has had varying effects upon jury selection processes.81 In those states where juror
7
SUnited States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140,
144 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).

79 Id.

80 See note 5 supra.
81 The most recent jury qualification statutes
and the minimum age requirements for the states
are: ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 21 (Supp. 1969) (not
under twenty-one); ALASKA STAT. § 09.20.010
(Supp. 1971) (at least nineteen); ARiz. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 21-301(a) (Supp. 1970) (registered
voter); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 39-101 (Supp.
1969) (registered voter); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §
198 (West 1974) (eighteen); CoLo. Rav. STAT.
ANN. § 78-1-1 (1963)(twenty-one); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 51-217 (Supp. 1973) (an elector);
(Supp.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4504(a)
1970) (qualified voter); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
40.01(1) (Supp. 1973) (eighteen); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 59-106 (Supp. 1973) (registered voter); HAWAII
REv. LAws § 612-4(1) (Supp. 1974) (eighteen);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2-209(2) (1974) (eighteen);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 78, § 2 (1973) (eighteen) ; IND.
ANN. STAT. § 33-4-5-7(1973) (registered voter);
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qualifications coincided with those for registered voters, eighteen to twenty-one year olds
were by law automatically included within the
jury panel.8 2 For other states, the constitutional amendment acted as a catalyst for legislative action.8 3 Some states initially rejected
the constitutional amendment as a basis for
IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.1 (1949) (qualified elector);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 43-156 (1971) (qualifications
of an elector); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29.025
(Supp. 1971) (at least eighteen) ; LA. CODE CRIM.

PRO. ANN. art. 401 (2) (West 1967) (at least twentyone); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1254 (Supp.
1973) (registered voter) ; MD. CODE ANN. art. 51, §
6(viii) (Supp. 1973) (eighteen); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 234, § 1 (Supp. 1973) (any qualified
voter) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A, 1306(a) (Supp.
1971) (an elector); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 593.04,
628.54 (1973) (eighteen) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 13STAT. §
5-1 (1972) (twenty-one); Mo. AxN.
494.010 (Supp. 1973) (over twenty-one); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 93-1301 (Supp. 1973) (eighteen) ;
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601 (1969) (over twentyone); NEv. REv. STAT. § 6.010 (1973) (qualified
elector) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 500.1 (Repl.
Vol. 1968) (selectman's list) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:69-1 (Supp. 1973) (twenty-one); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 19-1-1 (1953) (qualified elector); N.Y.
JUDICIARY LAWS § 662(2) (McKinney 1974) (eighteen) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-3 (1974) (eighteen);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-105(1) (Repl. Vol.
1973) (eighteen) ; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.06
(Baldwin 1973) (elector); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
38, § 28 (Supp. 1973) (elector) ; ORE. REv. STAT. §
10.030(c) (Repl. Vol. 1973) (over eighteen); PA.
STAT. tit. 17, § 942 (1962) (qualified elector); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-9-9 (1972)(over twenty-

one); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-52 (Supp.
1973) (twenty-one) ; S.D.
CODE
§§ 16-13.10
(1973) (eighteen); TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-101
(1973) (eighteen); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
2133 (Supp. 1973) (eighteen) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §
78-46-8(1) (1953) (over twenty-one) ; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, app. vii, pt. 1, R.25 (1973) (eighteen) ;
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-208-2 (Repl. Vol. 1974) (over
eighteen); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.36.070(1)
(Supp. 1973) (elector) ; W.VA. CODE ANN. § 52-1-1
(Supp. 1974) (eighteen); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
255.01(2) (1971) (qualified elector) ; Wyo. STAT.

ANN. § 1-77(1) (Supp. 1973) (an adult citizen).
82 Some states altered their requirements to coincide with those for voting qualification, thus obviating the need for a specific age provision.
83 See Kaufman, Harbingers of Atry Reform, 58
A.B.A.J. 695, 697 (1972) in which Judge Kaufman
of the first circuit stated that
it is likely that the consideration that moved
state legislatures rapidly to adopt the lower

voting age amendment most likely will move
them to lower the age for jury duty as well.
The trend toward lower age for state jury eligibility is already apparent.
He noted, furthermore, that some states' attorneys
general had ruled that eighteen year olds would be
automatically eligible, even in the absence of specific statutory provision.

amending their jury procedures to include
eighteen to twenty-one year olds, distinguishing voting and jury qualifications.8 4 Nevertheless, even this resistance to change has subsided, so that now only eleven states have
statutes precluding eighteen year olds from
85
jury service.
These states may eventually follow the example set by other states and relax their jury
qualifications. Until they take this step, however, the jury panels within these states arguably violate the cross-section requirement for
impartial juries. Undeniably, the same conditions which led other jurisdictions to recognize
the need for young adult jurors exist in these
states: voting age, criminal responsibility, eligibility for military and civil service among
others. Moreover, acceptance by some states of
the ability of eighteen to twenty-one year olds
to act as responsible jurors and denial of the
same fact in other states constitutes an unjusti-

fiable inconsistency. The states frequently cite
Carter v. Jury Commissioners6 as determinative of the states' right to prescribe relevant
qualifications for potential jurors and thus to
resist pressures directed at changing the mini84 See People v. Scott, 17 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 309
N.E.2d 257 (1974) ; State v. Silva, 259 So. 2d 153
(Fla. 1972). In the former case, the Illinois
Appellate Court held that the twenty-sixth amendment did not implicitly repeal the minimum age
requirement of twenty-one for jury service, nor
was it inconsistent or irreconcilable with the

higher minimum age.

85 Those states are Alabama, Alaska, Colorado,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina and Utah.
See note 81 supra.
86396 U.S. 320 (1970). The Court stated:
Whether jury service be deemed a right, a
privilege, or a duty, the State may no more
extend it to some of its citizens and deny it to
others on racial grounds than it may invidiously discriminate in the offering and with-

holding of the elective franchise .

. .

. That

kind of discrimination contravenes the very
idea of a jfury-'a body truly representative of
the community,'

composed of the peers or

equals of the person whose rights it is selected
or summoned to determine; that is, of his
neighbors, fellow associates, persons hawing
the same legal status in society as that which
he holds. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 308 (1879). (Emphasis added).
Id. at 330. Arguably, the cross-section should include young adults because they have the same
legal status as perons over twenty-one. Their exclusion from jury service contravenes the principle
of trial by one's peers for those criminal defend-

ants under twenty-one.
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mum age. In the Carter decision, however, the
Court held that the states' discretion must be
restricted where it jeopardizes the cross-section
requirement.
Another case, San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 7 provides an appropriate test of propriety for state laws. The
Court held that a standard of "strict judicial
scrutiny" applies wherever the laws of a state
operate to the disadvantage of a suspect class
of individuals or interfere with the exercise of
fundamental rights, either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.88 In the
present situation, the courts should follow the
same judicial standard to determine the constitutionality of laws excluding eighteen to twentyone year olds from jury service in light of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The fundamental right at stake,
that of the criminal defendant to have an impartial jury, demands this precaution.
Such careful scrutiny should also extend into
those jurisdictions where the exclusion of
young adults occurs because of a latent discriminatory application of jury selection procedures. In such cases, the legislatures have reformed the minimum age qualifications for
jury service, but the jury selection processes
in practice continue to exclude eighteen to
twenty-one year olds. Implementation of the
amended laws necessitates a revamping of the
lists from which the panels are drawn and perhaps a resort to additional lists if the original
fails to include the new group of eligible jurors. The tediousness and time-consuming aspects of this adjustment often result in a general reluctance to begin the process until a
change in law requires new juror lists.
Courts such as the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. DiTommaso 9 have actually supported
such activity by jury selection officials. In that
case, for instance, the criminal defendant demonstrated a disparity in the number of young
adults on the jury panel as compared to the
number of such young adults in the community. The court took judicial notice of
the likelihood that young adults, having
greater mobility than the average of the popu87
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
88

Id. at 3.

89 405 F.2d 385 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 394

U.S. 934 (1968).

lation, persons in military service, and young
women with small children and the responsibility of caring for them, would be more
likely than older adults having a relatively
fixed abode, not in military service and having
grown families, 90
to be unresponsive to jury questionnaires. The
court thus dismissed the possibility of a flaw in
the system itself.
In other cases, the courts also have refused
to recognize actions as resulting in impermissible exclusion.91 In order to show a violation of
the sixth or fourteenth amendment, the claimant must show that exclusion from the crosssection was systematic and intentional. Hamling v. United States, a recent Supreme Court
case, upheld the Ninth Circuit finding that
petitioners had failed to
establish a purposeful systematic exclusion of
the members of that class [eighteen to twentyone year olds] whose names, but for such
systematic exclusion would otherwise be se92
lected for the master jury wheel.
In this case, the master jury wheel from which
federal jury panels were selected had not been
refilled for nearly four years. Because eligibility at the last refilling had been restricted to
citizens twenty-one and over, the youngest
juror in the master jury wheel at the time of
petitioner's trial in 1972 was twenty-four. The
Court deemed this exclusion of eighteen to
twenty-four year olds an unavoidable consequence of judicial administration, rather than a
systematic exclusion.93 Yet it left unanswered
the fundamental question of whether a court
may correctly subordinate the right of the
criminal defendant to an impartial jury to
such an exaggerated form of administrative
convenience. 94
90
Id. at
91

389.
See generally Twelve Good Persons, supra
note
9 37, at 573, 584-87.
2 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 137
(1975).
93 Id. at 138. The court stated:
Congress could reasonably adopt procedures
which, while designed to assure that 'an impartial jury is drawn from a cross-section of
the community,' Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,
328 U.S. 217, 220, at the same time take into
account practical problems in judicial administration.
Id.
94 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535
(1975), in which the Court criticized the state's
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United States v. Gunmian demonstrates another technique by which the courts have
avoided the issue of exclusion of young adults
from jury panels. In that case, the court stated
that where a particular group is under-represented in the source of the jury panel names,
the court will infer intentional or systematic
exclusion. 95 The test of under-representation,
as set forth in United States v. Butera, consists
of comparing the percentage of representation
of the group in the source list with the percentage of the group in the total population.
Where the percentage in the latter category
exceeds that of the former, the Butera court
suggested that such disparity constitutes an
inference of discrimination necessitating correction. 9 G The court in Guizman stated that the
failure of the Butera court to establish precise limits for permissible disparities in percentage made such a test impracticable. Thus
the Guzman court refused to infer from the
facts of the case that the jury selection process
constituted prohibited discrimination against
97
any group.
As the minority opinion states in White v.
Georgia, statistical disproportions in jury panel
analyses deserve more weight than they have
received thus far.98 The petitioners in that case
claimed that the state jury selection process
discriminated against young adults in violation
of their fourteenth amendment rights. The
Court dismissed the case for lack of a substantive federal question,99 thus avoiding the issue
of whether statistically disproportionate underuse of "administrative convenience" as a justification for exempting women as a class from jury
service. The fact that jury duty would constitute
a special hardship for some women was an insufficient reason for diluting the quality of community judgment represented by the jury in criminal
trials. This same point applies to the exclusion of
eighteen to twenty-one year olds which courts attribute to the hardship jury service causes for that
segment of the community. See State v. Holmstrom, 43 Wis. 2d 465, 472, 168 N.W.2d 574, 577
(1969).
95 United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140,
143 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
96 United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 570
(1st Cir. 1970).
97 United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140,
143 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
98414 U.S. 886, 888 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissent-

ing).
99 Id. at 886.
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representation of cognizable groups in the
state jury pool would constitute a prima facie
case of discrimination. In their dissenting
opinion, however, Justices Brennan, Douglas,
and Marshall found clear evidence of underrepresentation of eighteen to thirty year olds
in the statistics offered by petitioners. Although 26.2 per cent of the community were
eligible young adults in this age category, only
3.0 per cent of the petit jury pool and 1.25 per
cent of the grand jury pool were within that
age group. The under-representation amounted
to 95.2 per cent in the grand and 88.2 per cent
in the petit jury pools. While noting that there
is no constitutional right to mathematically
proportional representation on jury panels, the
minority stated that the selection procedure
must provide "a fair possibility for obtaining a
representative cross-section." 100 The dissenters
questioned whether the principle of Alexander
v. Louisiana'"' should apply whenever any
large identifiable segment of the community is
arbitrarily or discriminately under-represented
on a jury panel.
Alexander v. Louisiana concerned an allegation that the grand jury indictment was invalid
because it was returned by a grand jury selected from an unrepresentative panel. The
selection process required potential jurors to
fill out questionnaires regarding their qualifications, and included a question about the race of
the applicant. Relying upon a combination of
statistical and factual considerations, the Court
found that defendants had established a prima
facie case of discriminatory jury selection.
Moreover, the Court held that the process resulted in the systematic exclusion of eligible
black jurors in violation of the sixth
amendment.'9 2
Following the Alexander formula, the first
step in the defendant's case necessitates convincing the court of the existence of eighteen
to twenty-one year olds as an identifiable segment of the community. While an examination
of objective factors implicitly demonstrates this
fact, a standard by which courts may directly
determine the identity of that or other segments of the community remains a mystery. As
100 Id. at 889-90 (Brennan,
101405 U.S. 625 (1972).
102

Id. at 630.

3., dissenting).

1975]

EXCLUSION OF YOUNG ADULTS FROM JURIES

the discussion earlier suggested, the courts' reluctance thus far to recognize young adults as
a part of the cross-section stems from a stringent definition of group status. In light of two
current trends, however, a change to a more
flexible approach in defining the cross-section
appears likely.
First, the increase in responsibility extended
to eighteen to twenty-one year olds during the
past decade suggests a general movement toward acceptance of eighteen as the age of political and social maturity. As society has
adopted that viewpoint, the state and federal
governments have slowly begun to regard
eighteen to tventy-one year olds as part of the
cross-section for matters such as jury service.
Public pressure will presumably compel those
jurisdictions which still exclude young adults
to follow the pattern.
The second trend indicative of future flexibility in defining the cross-section lies in the Supreme Court decisions concerning that crosssection. In Handing v. United States, for
example, the Court declared unconstitutional a
special statutory exemption from jury service
for women. It thus resolved a struggle which
began when society treated women as an amorphous part of the community, much as the
courts now regard eighteen to twenty-one year
olds. Together these two factors lead to the
conclusion that the present unresponsiveness of
the courts to the role of young adults in the
community will change with respect to jury
service.
Under the second element of Alexander, the
defendant must demonstrate the lack of current
justification for the form of exclusion operating against young adults in the jury process.
Where such exclusion arises from statutory
minimum age provisions, the defendant may
base his argument on Carter v. Jury Commissioners. Although the Court held in that case
that the states possess an undeniable right to
prescribe certain qualifications for their
jurors, 0 3 the states do not have unlimited
powers of discretion. More specifically, the
states do not have
the power to legislate that different treatment
be accorded to persons placed by a statute into
1-' Carter v. jury Commissioners, 396 U.S. 320,
332 (1970).

different classes on the basis of criteria wholly
unrelated to the objective of the statute. 0 4
In establishing jury qualifications, the states'
only legitimate objective is to obtain a panel of
jurors competent to determine the criminal defendant's guilt or innocence. 10 5 In light of the
fact that society deems eighteen to twenty-one
year olds competent to accept most other responsibilities, the continuation of a statute
which excludes them from jury service bears
no rational relationship to the states' objectives. Furthermore, as the Court stated in
Thiel v. SouthernPacific Co.:
[J]ury competence is an individual rather
than a group or class matter. That fact lies at
the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent
to the democratic ideals of trial by jury.10 6
Jury selection should not exclude eighteen to
twenty-one year olds on the basis of the hardship which jury duty causes for a few within
that group, since the state and federal jury
statutes make special provision for exemptions
in the case of undue hardship or extreme inconvenience resulting from jury service. Finally, the process of voir dire enables the parties to eliminate any jurors, whether eighteen
or fifty, whom they deem incompetent. Thus a
statute which excludes young adults has no
reasonable connection with the objective of se104 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971). The
Court in this case considered the application of the
fourteenth amendment equal protection clause to
state legislation which differentiated between the
sexes in probate administration.
205 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). The
Court here recognized:
'The purpose of the jury trial . . . is to pre-

vent oppression by the Government. Providing
the accused with the right to be tried by a
jury of his peers gave him an inestimable
' Duncam, mtpra, at 156. Given
safeguard ....
this purpose, the essential feature of a jury
obviously lies in the inter-position between the
accused and the accuser of the commonsense
judgment of a group of laymen, and in the
community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or innocence.
Id. at 100 (emphasis added).
100 Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217,
220 (1946).
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lecting competent jurors and therefore prevents selection of an impartial jury by unreasonably excluding a part of the cross-section.
Exclusion during the implementation of jury
selection laws allows the defendant to dispense
with argument about the competency of young
adults, since a statute already recognizes that
fact. Instead, the defendant must demonstrate
by factual and statistical analyses that the jury
panel improperly omits representation of young
adults as a segment of the community. Where
the defendant establishes a blatant under-representation of young adults on the panel, the
possibility of discrimination in the process then
arises.
If the court accepted such analyses, the burden of proof would shift to the government to
rebut the presumption of improper jury
selection. 10 7 The problems which would confront the government would arise not only
from the fundamental nature of the right to an
impartial jury, but also from the subtlety of
the influence on a jury determination which
any segment of the community may have. Furthermore, the government's rebuttal would require proof that the selection process did not
jeopardize any of the rights and interests
which jury impartiality protects. These rights
and interests include the defendant's right to
an impartial jury, the interests of those persons excluded under an outmoded jury selection provision or implementation of a reformed
process, and the national or state interest in
preserving a basic tenet of representative govAlexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630
(1972).
107

ernment-the cross-section standard for jury
panels. 08
CONCLUSION

Under-representation or total exclusion of
young adults constitutes a potential threat to
the sixth amendment guarantee of jury impartiality. The fact that a young defendant may
find himself confronted by a panel of jurors
whose values, attitudes, experiences, and ages
differ greatly from his poses a serious problem.
To alleviate the possibility of bias against
young defendants, jury selection processes
should include in the panel persons of ages
closer to those of young defendants.
An additional threat engendered by the exclusion of young adults from jury panels stems
from the ambiguous matter in which the legal
system and society treat young adults. This
group bears more responsibility for the society
in which it lives than any previous generation
of young adults in this country; yet, its rights
to participate in the functions of the government which controls its actions remain as
limited as those of earlier generations. Such
ambiguities only bely the tenets upon which
this representative government operates. Thus
inclusion of eighteen -to twenty-one year olds
would not only increase the probability of a
truly impartial jury system, but would also
encourage a deeper respect for the concepts
of criminal justice.
108 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530

(1975) ; Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 498 (1972).
See also Comment, Jury Discrimination in the
South-a Remedy?, 8 CoLut. J.L. & Soc. PROB.

589, 594-96 (1972).

